Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 28, 1968, 1420Z.

5335. Subj: Thirteenth senior MAC members meeting at Panmunjom. Meeting began at 1600 hrs local and ended at 1748.² Much time was consumed by composition ad hoc statements. Both release of crew and delivery of mail were discussed (latter reported septel).³

2. Discussion of main item somewhat disjointed since RAdm Smith, who spoke first as one who called meeting, led off with statement contained para two, State 135403, as amended by State 135734;⁴ whereas Pak’s first statement ignored this and addressed itself at length to position Smith had taken at 12th meeting. In essence, Pak raised govt-to-govt issue, criticized ambiguous nature and phraseology of proposal Smith had made at 12th meeting, reasserted NK demand for proper apology, [garble] negotiations. At end, Pak said he had no objection to Smith’s understanding that Pak would call next meeting.

3. Pak’s first (and only substantive) statement opened with accusation that it was US, not NK, which responsible for tension, describing Pueblo intrusion and force build-up as part of premeditated maneuvers to provoke new war. Pak alleged that US position was that it perfectly all right for side which had infringed on sovereignty of another country to make threats while denying country whose sovereignty had been infringed on its right to self defense. This he described as “logic of stronger playing upon weaker.” Such methods may go down with those suffering with nervous breakdown but not with Korean people. Clinging to such logic will make it impossible to settle Pueblo and only bring about unfavorable results.

4. Pak then alleged that US and not NK had violated understanding regarding secrecy of meetings,⁵ ending with rather strange statement that “I inform your side in advance that we shall act following this principle in the future.”

5. Pak asserted meetings are between reps of two govts. Said Smith has continued “discourteous act” of calling DPRK “North Korea,” and that US must take into consideration fact that it can never solve question of crew without dealing with Govt of DPRK.⁶

6. Pak then said NK had noted statement made at 12th meeting that US prepared to make due apology and give assurance when crew of Pueblo is returned. Said, however, there are “not a few ambiguous points in US proposals.” Referring to US admission that Pueblo had been on intelligence-gathering mission at time it was captured, Pak said whole world knows that armed spy ship Pueblo was engaged in espionage mission from outset. Said question is that Pueblo was not only on intelligence-gathering mission but was captured in territorial waters of DPRK while conducting espionage acts; US “must take precisely this point into account.”

7. Pak noted that Smith had said US Navy ships would continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from “the DPRK.” Said NK takes notice of this, understanding it as assurance against further violation by US Navy ships of DPRK territorial waters.

8. Pak then raised expression of regret for possible intrusion. Said at first sight it seems US prepared to bear responsibility for behavior of captain and crew and to apologize. In reality, however, US position is “nothing else but phrase making, using slippery ambiguous phrases,” which under careful examination shows US wants to express regret for “certain unknown hypothetical action.” “Is there anything in it? Nothing.” With such phrase making US cannot conceal obvious crime or deceive anybody. “Don’t you think that if you want to settle the matter you must among others make an apology properly at least?” Only then can so-called US proposal be taken into consideration as basis for practical settlement.

9. Smith responded that NK not approaching question in businesslike manner. Said NK had not been specific about desired changes in US proposal. Asked whether NKorean side had specific proposal in writing which meeting could address. Pak responded that his first statement was businesslike matter for practical settlement of question.

10. Smith said US had taken note of all that had been said and published and had made reasonable proposal under circumstances. If Pak had no written proposal to table, could he come to next meeting with one? Stated it Pak’s turn to call next meeting. Pak reiterated that his first statement offered businesslike suggestion for settlement and recommended Smith seriously study it. Stated no objection to understanding NK would call next meeting.⁷

11. Comment: Pak’s main statement, delivered in firm but not particularly harsh manner, supports our belief that NK is attempting obtain unambiguous apology from USG to DPRK Govt for intrusion, espionage, and commission of hostile acts. Believe this is first time at closed meetings that Pak has specifically stated Pueblo was captured in NK territorial waters.

12. Apparent willingness to accept US language on assurance (para 7) is probably false lure. Pak’s statements today also notable for absence of threat to try crew; however, NK would probably feel that crew’s letters over past week have covered this adequately.

13. Pak will speak first at next meeting, presumably addressing himself to whatever NK can make of second para of Smith’s first statement today and possibly to nature of receipt Smith mentioned in third para, since Pak and his assistant appeared interested when Smith mentioned (para 9 above) specific changes in US position.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus.
2. Telegram 5336 from Seoul, March 28, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Document 300 and footnote 4 thereto.
5. Reference is to Smith’s reference at the last meeting to a Radio Pyongyang broadcast on March 10 that violated the confidentiality of the meetings. (Telegram 131680 to Seoul, March 16; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
6. Smith decided, and the Department of State agreed, to avoid references to “North Korea” in future meetings by using phrases such as “your coast” or “land area under control your side.” (Telegram 5602 from Seoul, April 10, and telegram 144339 to Seoul, April 10; both ibid.)
7. Since the Department of State expected Pak to make similar remarks at the next meeting, Smith was instructed to draw on past instructions as appropriate. The Department provided guidance covering various contingencies. (Telegram 139480 to Seoul, March 30; ibid.)