Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

300. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea¹

Washington, March 23, 1968, 0043Z.

135403. Subject: Instructions for Thirteenth Closed Meeting. Ref: Seoul 5058.²

1. We believe that next closed meeting should be held day or two after open meeting which Communist side has requested.³ We suggest that you get the open meeting out of way as soon as possible which might make it possible for Admiral Smith to call closed meeting on March 26 or 27. This should give Pak ample time to react to Smith’s proposal at last meeting.

2. At thirteenth meeting, Smith should open with following brief statement:

A. At our last meeting I made a further specific proposal. You responded by saying that you understood my remarks as an expression of willingness to discuss concrete and practical means of settling the matter before us on the basis of your earlier proposal. You further indicated that, if your understanding was correct, you would be ready at this meeting to discuss concrete means of repatriating the crew of the Pueblo.

B. I can confirm that your understanding of my remarks was consistent with my intention. The proposal which I laid before you at our last meeting was based on careful study of your statements in these private meetings and was deliberately cast in the general framework of your proposals.⁴

C. Since we agree on these matters, I am prepared to move on to the concrete and businesslike discussion which you proposed at our last meeting. Specifically, I am prepared to discuss the time, place and other arrangements for release of the Pueblo’s officers and men. I propose that the Pueblo’s officers and men be turned over to me on March 29⁵ at the Joint Security Area here in Panmunjom. Information on the condition of wounded would be appreciated so needed medical personnel and transport could be on hand at time of transfer. We assume body of Hodges will be turned over at same time and place as 82 surviving members of crew are released. At the time of release of the men, I will be prepared to sign a receipt incorporating the proposal which I made at our last meeting.

3. Pak’s response is difficult to anticipate and all possibilities cannot be covered in these instructions.

A. If Pak levels general blast against Smith’s proposals at twelfth meeting. Smith should not respond in kind, but merely ask Pak to specify in what respect Smith’s proposals are unsatisfactory and to state precisely how Pak would wish to modify them.

B. If Pak attempts to twist Smith’s opening statement into a complete capitulation to the North Korean demands, Smith should correct him by repeating verbatim his proposals of twelfth meeting (para 4.E. State 131680).⁶

C. If Pak rejects Smith’s specific proposals (para 2.C. above) on time and place of release of men, Smith should request alternative proposals.

D. If Pak asks Smith for language of receipt which Smith would be prepared to sign, Smith should read and hand over unsigned copy of the following draft:

• “(1) I hereby acknowledge receipt of 82 members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges.
• (2) I have read and taken note of the confessions of the crew of the Pueblo that the ship was engaged in intelligence-gathering activity and intruded closer than 12 nautical miles to the territory of North Korea,⁷ and other documents to the same effect provided by the Senior North Korean representative.
• (3) I have taken note of the request of the Senior North Korean representative that the United States Government should, based upon these documents, express regret for these actions and issue assurance that no U.S. ship shall in the future come closer than 12 nautical miles from North Korea.
• (4) Based on the foregoing, I

  (a) acknowledge that the U.S.S. Pueblo was on an intelligence-gathering mission when she was seized by the North Korean armed forces.

  (b) give assurance that ships of the U.S. Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than twelve nautical miles from North Korea.

  (c) express regret for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship’s approaching closer than twelve nautical miles to North Korea.”

  D [sic]. We are prepared, if doing so would result in release, to omit words “may have” in para 4.c. of receipt. We are also prepared to consider any other language which does not admit validity of the North Korean “evidence” or apologize for acts which we consider unproven.FYI. We will not sign a helicopter-case type of receipt. End FYI.

4. FYI. Return of ship not mentioned in these instructions because doing so might reduce prospects of obtaining early release of men. (At seventh meeting, Pak said “return of the ship cannot be the subject of the discussion … It will be good if you do not mention this question again.”) As soon as men have been returned, however, Smith should immediately state that he is now prepared to discuss the return of the ship and call or ask Pak to call a further closed meeting for that purpose. End FYI.

5. At close of meeting, Smith should attempt to confirm fact that it is Pak’s turn to call next meeting.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Yager and Brown, cleared by Steadman and Walsh, and approved by Katzenbach.
2. Telegram 5058 from Seoul, March 21, transmitted the verbatim text of the meeting. (Ibid.)
3. An open MAC meeting, lasting 53/4 hours, was held March 25. The North Koreans complained about five separate raids into the DMZ penetrated by ROK forces in March. (Telegram 5145 from Seoul, March 25; ibid., POL 27–14 KOR/UN)
4. In telegram 5120, March 25, the Embassy in Seoul objected to the language used in paragraphs A and B as being “far reaching” and perhaps being on the verge of renouncing previous positions. Porter also mentioned the need to consider the ROK point of view and expressed his intention to meet with the President and Foreign Minister to make clear that the United States “will not consider language which would admit validity of NK ‘evidence’ or apologize for acts which we consider unproven.” (Ibid., POL 33–6 KOR N–US) In response the Department of State agreed to delete the acknowledgment that the U.S. molded its response to the framework suggested by the North Koreans and approved Porter’s approach to the President and Foreign Minister. (Telegram 135734 to Seoul, March 25; ibid.)
5. Since the date of the next closed meeting was uncertain, Smith was instructed to set a date 2 days after the date of the meeting. (Telegram 135542 to Seoul, March 23; ibid.)
6. See footnote 3, Document 299.
7. The Embassy suggested that, since previous references implying recognition of North Korea had been scrupulously avoided, the words “the territory of” be deleted here. The Department of State concurred. (Telegram 5199 from Seoul, March 27, and telegram 136936 to Seoul, March 27; both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)