Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

297. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson¹

Washington, March 14, 1968.

SUBJECT

• USS Pueblo

After eleven closed meetings we have made little progress at Panmunjom. As conditions for the release of the crew (they have made clear they will not return the ship), the North Koreans demand:

• —an admission by us of hostile acts and intrusion into their claimed territorial waters;
• —“a proper apology”;
• —a guarantee against future similar incidents.

We know—and can prove—that at least some of the documents which they have given us are falsified. I firmly believe that we should not admit incursions which we are reasonably certain did not occur.

We have said that after release of the crew to our custody or that of a neutral power we would investigate thoroughly, and express regrets if any intrusion had in fact occurred. We have suggested that this investigation could be made by an impartial body. The North Koreans have responded that their “evidence” is conclusive and that an inquiry is unjustified. They have also said that if we persist in our attitude it will show “no concern for the crew”, and require them to take “other steps” against these men—presumably trial and/or punishment.

Pak has just advised the NNSC that U.S. proposals so far have been unsatisfactory (e.g., have not included an apology or offer of compensation) and that he does not propose to call or attend another meeting until he knows that we have some “constructive” proposals to make.

This, then, is where we now stand. Our next step is to see that the twelfth meeting is held fairly soon and to prepare instructions for it. At this point, I think it best that we pass the buck back to the North Koreans.

Thus, if you approve, we plan to instruct Admiral Smith to:

Send word to Pak through NNSC that we expect him to call the twelfth meeting soon and that we would have something to say which would be of interest to him.

At the meeting Admiral Smith would:

• 1. Say that we have a precise and constructive proposal, to wit:
• That at the time of the release of the crew we would
  • —acknowledge the intelligence gathering mission of the Pueblo;
  • —assure North Korea that we would continue to instruct U.S. ships to remain more than 12 miles from the North Korean coast;
  • —express regret for any violations of the Pueblo’s orders which may have resulted in the ship’s coming closer than 12 miles from North Korea. (This is slightly further than we have yet gone on regrets—and as far as I think we should go.)
• 2. Point out that Pak has not made equally precise proposals.
• 3. Remind Pak that, while we are concerned about the crew, our primary concern is with the heightening of tensions in the area caused by their provocative and illegal acts.

(A draft instruction to Admiral Smith is at Tab A.)²

Recommendation: That you approve the instruction at Tab A.

Approve³

Disapprove

Speak to me

Concurrently, we plan to let the Russians know—perhaps through a reliable correspondent here—that continuing to hold the crew is not necessarily helpful to the North Koreans. For example, seizure of the Pueblo has made certain an additional $100 million in military aid to the South Koreans. It also will make it easier for the Administration to call up substantial reserves if this becomes necessary, and could always be an additional support for Administration calls for greater effort in Korea or Viet-Nam. We would expect that the Russians would pass this on to North Korea. (Chip Bohlen has looked at this idea and thinks it a good one.)

Recommendation: That you authorize us to have a reliable newsman talk to the Russian Embassy along the above lines.

Approve⁴

Disapprove

Speak to me

Once we have gone through the next meeting—which will probably produce no real forward movement—we will be hard against the decision on where to go next. We shall probably have two main choices:

1. Stonewall. Admiral Smith could defer calling another meeting and confine himself to informing Pak that he is prepared to meet again if Pak has something new and constructive to say.

2. Apology. Smith could call the next meeting and either:

• —ask Pak for precise language for an apology which would lead to the release of the crew, or
• —table a specific draft of the receipt which Smith would be willing to sign at the time the men are released.

We must face the fact that it is unlikely that any course will lead to a quick return of the crew. If we stonewall now, there is perhaps a small chance that the North Koreans will advance some proposal that will get things moving again. But this is very unlikely. It is far more probable that they will continue along their present course, making propaganda points where they can. They may even decide—as a pressure tactic—to bring the crew to trial.

If we ask them to let us know what they want from us in way of an apology, they probably will refuse to give us anything. If they do come up with suggested language, it will almost certainly be something we can’t possibly live with.

If we give them suggested wording for a receipt they will reject it, and we will be faced with a long series of meetings in which we will argue over language—to the benefit of the North Koreans.

In my view, we should stonewall for a bit longer to see if the North Koreans move at all in our direction. But, if things drag on too long without result or without “further steps” by the North Koreans vis-a-vis the crew, I believe we should be prepared to break off the talks and publish the record. This will improve our public image here and abroad at the expense of North Korea’s. It would make it virtually impossible to get the crew back in the foreseeable future.

In preparation for such a contingency, we are working on a White Paper which will give the full story of North Korean provocation, U.S. restraint, fairness and moderation at Panmunjom, and demonstrate the falsity of the North Korean “evidence”. This should certainly be published in case the crew were put on trial, or if we or the North Koreans break off talks. (It could also be published immediately after the release of the crew, assuming we decide to go the conditional apology route and it is successful.)

We are all convinced that minor military actions or shows of force would have no constructive effect. Some really massive effort—such as an attempt to eliminate the North Korean Air Force—involves obvious costs and risks. We do not recommend it.

Dean Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IV, Cactus Miscellaneous Papers, February to December 1968. Secret; Nodis. Attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, March 14, in which Rostow noted “Rusk’s proposals on the Pueblo as we approach a dead end” and expressed “one thought: mine Haiphong and regard our Pueblo men as prisoners of the Vietnam war.” Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw it.
2. Not printed; the instructions were sent to Smith in telegram 131680 to Seoul, March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
3. This option is checked and a handwritten note indicates Rostow notified Walsh on March 16.
4. See footnote 3 above.