Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

296. Memorandum From the Director of the Korean Task Force (Brown) to the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach)¹

Washington, March 11, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Next Moves at Panmunjom

The closed talks in Panmunjom appear to have reached an impasse. I believe that we must now choose one of five possible courses of action:

1. Stonewall repetition of our present position.

2. Publish falsity of North Korean “evidence”, with or without private advance notice to the U.S.S.R.

3. Offer conditional expression of regret.

4. Sign helicopter-type receipt.

5. Ask Pak for language of apology or receipt which would meet his requirements.

It is pretty clear now that stonewalling would achieve nothing but would damage the reasonable record which we have thus far made in the talks and risk early trial and/or punishment of the crew. Exposing the North Korean “evidence” at this stage might both harden the North Korean position and precipitate a decision to try and punish the crew. The U.S.S.R. is not likely to be impressed by exposure of the falsity of North Korean evidence or to be either willing or able to be helpful. Signing a receipt similar to that signed by General Combs in the helicopter case would amount to the very humiliation of the U.S. which the North Koreans are seeking and would cause serious trouble with the ROK. Asking Pak for his language would probably lead to prolonged negotiations damaging to our relations with the ROK. In the end, we would probably have to choose between breaking off the talks or signing a humiliating statement.

Offering a conditional expression of regret also poses difficulties, but these appear to be of a lesser order than those noted for the other four possible courses of action. Thus, such an offer could lead to prolonged negotiations, but these might be avoided by indicating that the substance of our offer was not negotiable.

The possible formulation of conditional expressions of regret are of course almost infinite. The three best formulations which we have been able to come up with are set forth in the attachment in order of preference.

We also attach a draft presidential letter received informally from DOD/ISA which contains an expression of regret in response to the Pueblo crew’s letter of February 29.² The principal difficulties which we see with DOD’s suggestion are (1) it escalates the level of the expression of regret and therefore the degree of humiliation; (2) it would accord a degree of status to the North Korean regime and cause a violent reaction in the ROK; and (3) it appears to validate the letter ostensibly signed by all members of the crew.

As we now see it, a conditional expression of regret should probably not be tabled until the 13th meeting. We would use the 12th meeting primarily to request clarification of the North Korean position. A draft instruction for the 12th meeting is attached.³

Attachment

CONDITIONAL EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET

Draft One

1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges.

2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo’s crew, I am authorized to state:

A. The sailing orders of the USS Pueblo explicitly directed that the ship remain at least 13 nautical miles from North Korean territory. Ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea.

B. The North Korean authorities have made public photographs of documents which they regard as proof that on several occasions the USS Pueblo entered their claimed coastal waters. The United States Government has not until now been in a position to verify independently the evidence on which the North Korean authorities rely. We nevertheless have no hesitation in expressing regret, in advance of the full and impartial inquiry which will now be conducted, for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship’s approaching closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korean territory.

Signed:
John V. Smith ⁴
Rear Admiral, USN

Draft Two

1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges.

2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo’s crew, I am authorized to state:

A. The sailing orders of the USS Pueblo explicitly directed that the ship remain at least 13 nautical miles from North Korean territory. Ships of the United States Navy will continue to be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea.

B. The North Korean authorities have made public photographs of documents which they regard as conclusive proof that the USS Pueblo was on an intelligence gathering mission and that on several occasions the USS Pueblo entered their claimed coastal waters. The United States Government has not until now been in a position to verify independently the evidence on which the North Korean authorities rely. The United States Government does not dispute that the USS Pueblo was on an intelligence gathering mission and has no hesitation in expressing regret for any violation of orders by the USS Pueblo which may have resulted in the ship’s approaching closer than 12 nautical miles to North Korean territory.

Signed:
John V. Smith
Rear Admiral, USN

Draft Three

1. I acknowledge receipt of the 82 surviving members of the crew of the USS Pueblo and the body of Seaman Wayne D. Hodges.

2. On the occasion of the release of the Pueblo’s crew, I am authorized to state:

A. The USS Pueblo, a commissioned ship of the United States Navy, was captured on January 23, 1968 by patrol craft of the Korean People’s Army while engaged in an intelligence gathering mission off the coast of North Korea.

B. The North Korean authorities regard the Pueblo’s mission as provocative and have provided the United States with photographic copies of documents which they regard as conclusive evidence that the Pueblo intruded into North Korean territorial seas.

C. As conditions for the release of the Pueblo’s crew, the North Korean authorities have demanded that the United States both apologize and provide assurance that intrusions of the nature cited above will not occur in the future.

D. In response to these North Korean demands, I am authorized to declare:

1. Ships of the United States Navy will be ordered to remain more than 12 nautical miles from the coast of North Korea.

2. The United States expresses regret for any hostile acts contrary to international law which may have been committed by the USS Pueblo.

Signed:
John V. Smith

Rear Admiral, USN

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Nodis.
2. See the attachment to Document 295.
3. Not printed.
4. Each of the three drafts contains this typed signature; none is signed.