275. Notes of Meeting1
SUBJECT
- Notes of the President’s Luncheon Meeting
PRESENT
- Secretary Rusk
- Secretary McNamara
- CIA Director Helms
- Clark Clifford
- General Wheeler
- Walt Rostow
- George Christian
- Tom Johnson
Director Helms: The report on a possible air attack by North Korea on Seoul was unnecessarily alarming. There is nothing to it.2
We are worried by reports that the North Koreans have the log of the Pueblo and are publicizing specific co-ordinates.
Secretary Rusk: An operations order of 1966 CINCPAC Fleet permitted these ships to go up to a three mile limit.3 We need to check to see if such an operation order might have been aboard this craft.
General Wheeler: The Pacific Command was placed on a high state of alert for the possibility of an attack on South Korea in any case.
Mr. Rostow: Representative Pucinski took Secretary Rusk’s answer to Representative Carey on Capitol Hill last week. He violated his word about the off-the-record nature of the discussion in the belief he was helping the administration.
The President: When is our next meeting with the North Koreans?
[Page 623]Walt Rostow: 9 p.m. tonight.4
[Here follows discussion of the situation in Vietnam.]
[The President asked if Vance should go to Vietnam at the conclusion of his mission to South Korea and went on to say] I think Cy has a point that Pak wants me to get the message from him as quickly as possible.
Secretary Rusk: Also we should not underestimate the trouble with South Korea Vance is handling.
General Wheeler: Admiral Sharp asked me whether we should move the cruiser Canberra from the Sea of Japan back to Vietnam in light of the political problems this might cause with South Korea.
The President: What is the situation on the Pueblo?
Secretary Rusk: Ambassador Bohlen and I are having lunch with Dobrynin later this week. I am perturbed by this broadcast giving the log, plot, and co-ordinates of the ship. The North Koreans may want a confession and an apology. It is hard to confess something when you do not believe you did it. We need independent access to our men, but they may have us.
The President: Should we review the orders on all ships of this type?
Wheeler: The Pueblo Task Force under George Ball is looking at this now.
The President: Is there a significant difference in intelligence gathered three miles out versus fourteen miles out?
Director Helms: It depends on what you want to get. The farther out the ship is, the less communications intelligence you get.
[Here follows further discussion of Vietnam.]
- Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings, Luncheon Group, February 13, 1968. Top Secret. Drafted by Tom Johnson. The meeting was held in the White House.↩
- The comment apparently refers to North Korean messages of February 9 and 10 [text not declassified] indicating that the Soviets and North Koreans planned an atomic attack on Seoul and Osan. Several [text not declassified] officials received the report without being notified of the tenuousness of its contents, thus spawning [text not declassified] demands for increased military preparedness and similar measures. [text not declassified] concluded that the intercepted communication was merely part of a training exercise and represented no danger of imminent attack to South Korea. (Telegram from DIRNSA to the White House, February 14; National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, Historical Files, Box 4, V. Initial Reaction)↩
- A copy of this order is attached to a February 13 memorandum from Leonard to Berger. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US)↩
- The senior members met in open session on February 15 at 1400 (KST).↩