Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

207. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

No. 870

Washington, November 8, 1968.

SUBJECT

• North Korean Seaborne Infiltrations into the ROK

North Korean armed infiltrators landed on both coasts of South Korea over the weekend of November 1–3. The two seaborne operations mark the end of a virtual hiatus in coastal infiltration during most of 1968.²

Coordinated Intrusions. Two North Korean infiltrators were sighted in the morning of November 1 near Sosan on the west coast of South Korea. Later in the day, a ROK force sweeping the area killed two intruders in a firefight. A cache of equipment, including dynamite, was discovered nearby. No further infiltrators were subsequently detected in the area.

Two days later on November 3, a series of firefights broke out in the DMZ, one of them in response to a platoon-sized North Korean penetration. These incidents, and possibly the west coast landing, were evidently diversions staged in support of an unusually ambitious commando team landing midway down the east coast of the ROK. A suspicious boat was detected during the evening of November 2 off the east coast, but managed to elude capture after putting commandos ashore undetected near the town of Ulchin. The next day, armed North Korean agents moved into a small village in broad daylight, conducted propaganda sessions and distributed large sums of ROK currency (later reported to be counterfeit), and released the villagers a few hours later. One villager was killed, and three more civilians were later reported dead at the hands of the intruders.

In response, ROK security forces cordoned off a large area and had killed nine of the intruders as of November 8. The South Koreans appear confident of apprehending all the intruders, although the difficult terrain has slowed the task. There are conflicting reports of the total number of intruders, some of which put the original group at 30, while others speak of simultaneous landing of two 30-man teams.³

Infiltrators’ Mission. Until these two seaborne infiltrations, only three instances of North Korean agent landings along the ROK coast had been detected in 1968 despite our expectations of a higher number. The commando group was the first specially trained large group to attempt penetration of the ROK since the January 1968 raid on the Presidential Palace in Seoul. (In the January raid the intruders infiltrated through the DMZ.) The tactic of propagandizing villagers is new. It was evidently planned in advance, judging by the supply of counterfeit currency brought by the agents, their reported photographing of villagers and their requiring the villagers to put their thumb prints on a paper as a sign of allegiance to the communist cause. Supplies of propaganda leaflets and North Korean Workers Party membership applications were also discovered in the area. Thus it seems that maximum psychological impact was one of the goals of the North Korean team.

In a larger sense, the mission may have been designed to test the feasibility of winter guerrilla activities in the ROK patterned after Viet Cong tactics. The South Korean Defense Minister ventured this opinion in addressing the ROK National Assembly November 6, and it has been suggested privately by other ROK officials.⁴ So far it appears that the east coast operation has met with complete uncooperativeness on the part of the local populace, which has always proved to be the flaw in North Korean efforts to foment guerrilla activity in the ROK.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–7 KOR S. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem.
2. This incident was followed by the North Korean capture of 16 South Korean fishing boats and 76 fishermen on November 8 and 9. The Korean Desk officers believed that the actions were perpetrated so that the North Koreans could “obtain the intelligence they need in mounting infiltrations by sea.” (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum from Rostow to the President, November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)
3. A later analysis stated that about 120 armed infiltrators entered South Korea in the November operation. Of that number, a reported 107 had been killed, 7 were in ROK custody, and the rest were presumed to have perished from exposure to harsh winter conditions. (Intelligence Note No. 53, January 30, 1969; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 23–7 KOR S) The incident and its aftermath spurred the South Koreans to undertake a review of their counterinfiltration policies and organizations. (Telegrams 11631, December 6, and 11920, December 23, from Seoul; both ibid.)
4. Some ROK officials believed the actions were timed “to coincide with the US declaration of a bombing halt on North Viet-Nam,” a policy criticized by the ROK and SVN. Some also believed that the Ulchin raid “was a trial effort before carrying out large-scale guerrilla warfare against the ROK” following the pattern established by the Viet Cong of “trying to ‘liberate’ villages one by one.” (Memorandum from Leonard to Bundy, November 8, attached to a memorandum from Rostow to President Johnson, November 9; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI)