206. Intelligence Note From the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Secretary of State Rusk1
SUBJECT
- A North Korean in New York: Probable Repercussions
Several recent developments have suggested that Pyongyang is trying harder than usual to be represented in this year’s UN debate on the Korea question. The DPRK’s annual statement on the unification issue contained a softer approach to the UN,2 and an attempt has been made to have the representation issue taken up as a procedural matter rather than as part of the Korea question debate, with the aim of enhancing North Korea’s chances of being invited. Cambodia, Syria, and other delegations friendly to Pyongyang have submitted a draft resolution inviting North Korea without preconditions. Should a North Korean delegate actually go to New York, Pyongyang’s verbal aggressiveness might be abated somewhat, but adverse effects would probably accrue both in Seoul and in the U.S.
Better Behavior from Pyongyang? The seating of a representative in New York might cause the North Koreans to modify somewhat their strategy for achieving unification. Pyongyang’s willingness to participate in UN discussion of the Korea question should imply an appreciation of the importance of maintaining a good UN image. While the DPRK Government would probably continue to carry out DMZ harassment activities and infiltration attempts throughout the South at what have become “accepted” levels, and would still hope thereby to undercut ROK political and economic stability, it may be more circumspect with regard to serious provocations, such as last January’s Blue House raid and the Pueblo seizure.
Pyongyang’s foreign relations could not but benefit from the participation of a North Korean delegate in New York, even though substantive DPRK positions in the Korea debate would gain little support. [Page 444] Assuming its envoy would be able to carry out his ceremonial and propaganda responsibilities without any serious gaffes, his mere presence in New York would be regarded by many new nations in the UN—nations which did not exist at the time of the Korean war and have little appreciation of the roots of the Korean problem—as tantamount to an official UN stamp of legitimacy for the Pyongyang regime.
Repercussions in Seoul. Since Koreans generally are more concerned with the matter of representation per se than with the substance of the Korea question in the UN, a decision to permit North Korean representation would have a traumatic impact in South Korea. For years the Seoul press has been apprehensive about the so-called “UN formula” for achieving unification, on grounds that unification cannot possibly be realized through the UN, and also that continued, unimaginative reliance on the UN by the ROK Government will eventually redound to Pyongyang’s advantage. Despite their lack of constructive alternatives to the UN formula, the Government’s critics would give forth with loud cries of “we told you so.” Indeed, it may be expected that Pyongyang’s strategy in trying to have its representative invited to New York includes its hopes that such an occurrence would cause the South Korean people to lose faith in their government’s ability to defend ROK interests in the UN—and in the willingness of the US to help protect those interests.
We could anticipate, moreover, that the ROK Government would try to pass off much of the responsibility for such a debacle onto the US. There would certainly be some degree of official unhappiness expressed to us through the Foreign Ministry. The South Koreans tend to believe that their acceptance of US advice on the handling of the invitation issue each year entitles them to hold us responsible for the voting results. This problem is compounded by the tendency of Kim Yong-sik, Chief ROK Observer in New York, to submit vague and self-serving reports to Seoul regarding his role in the joint US–ROK-allied strategy sessions. He apparently wishes to convince his home government, if necessary, that some decisions are reached without his concurrence or over his objections.
Problems for the US. Aside from the matter of US–ROK relations, other difficulties would confront us if a North Korean were to attend the UN debate. Not the least of these is the problem of his security. Between the Korean war and the events of last January, a group of super-patriotic citizens—or perhaps some South Korean residents here—would not have to grope to justify expressing antagonistic feelings toward a Pyongyang official. Anti-North Korean protest demonstrations could be difficult to control.
But beyond this basically administrative problem is the question of our stature in the UN and our prestige in general. We have long [Page 445] resisted attempts by nations sympathetic to Pyongyang to prevent South Korean participation in the UN and, recently, to force a North Korean delegate into the proceedings. To many nations unfamiliar with the complexities of the problem it would seem that the US had finally lost the fight. Coming after the Pueblo seizure and subsequent propaganda exploitation of the crew, this would create more political and propaganda problems for the US, both at home and abroad.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 32–4 KOR. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.↩
- See IN–755, “North Korea States UN Position,” September 25, 1968 (Secret; No Foreign Dissem). [Footnote in the source text. According to that document, the North Koreans traditionally “rejected the UN’s competence and authority to deal with the Korea question on the grounds that the UN was ‘reduced to a belligerent’ in the Korean war.” They adopted a posture of blaming the United States for misusing the UN and professed their respect for the aims of the UN Charter and insisted on being invited to represent Korea in that body as the only legitimate government of that nation.]↩