Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

188. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 15, 1968, 0105Z.

4907. Subject: Additional ROK troops for Vietnam. Ref: A. State 128972;² B. Seoul 4784;³ C. Seoul 4572.⁴

1. We believe Dept has correctly identified main advantages and disadvantages of PriMin’s proposal for major augmentation of ROK troops in Vietnam. We could elaborate further on these in terms effect of proposal on NKorea’s aggressive plans and possible miscalculations, ROK/Vietnamese relations, command and control in both Vietnam and ROK, and ROK expectations with respect to conduct and settlement of Vietnam conflict, but Dept doubtless aware all these permutations.

2. Our own reaction to PriMin’s proposal is that he has been trying to pass us a message. As we interpret it, he is saying that circumstances in both Vietnam and ROK have been drastically altered by Tet offensive and Pueblo/Blue House raid, including their aftermath, and question of additional ROK forces for Vietnam now has to be viewed from entirely new perspective: that ROKs want us to make all-out military effort to settle Vietnam conflict once and for all, and would be willing under certain conditions to participate in such major effort. The ROKs are genuinely concerned. They are worried that VC and NVN may force compromise solution in UN if war carries on until U.S. elections. This would then, they feel, encourage Asian Communists to try concentrate next on ROK.

3. We believe he is also telling us that because of new circumstances previous understanding on despatch of light division alone would be regarded as piecemeal effort by ROK public, and Assembly and ROKG would have difficulty in supporting it now. He is hinting that ROK public accepts everything we have promised and implemented since Blue House raid/Pueblo incident, including light division quid pro quo items, as response to new situation here and that quid pro quo offered in exchange for light division would no longer be sufficient to justify political risks of proposing this relatively minor increase in ROK contribution. He is pointedly stressing that what is needed to obtain further ROK participation in Vietnam is very dramatic program—call for a larger ROK troop contribution matched by a larger U.S. aid program—which will clearly strengthen, as opposed to maintain, ROK military strength in country.

4. Extent to which PriMin’s proposal has Park’s backing is difficult to assess with certainty. If Park has been exposed to this plan, we doubt that it has been in more than general way. We feel that at this juncture proposal should be considered as being essentially PriMin’s without Park’s approval. Proposal, if implemented, has serious budgetary implications for ROKG—a factor which would be of lesser concern to PriMin but would give Park pause because of potential impact on economic development programs. We suspect origins of PriMin’s proposal are to be found in his recent activities in Defense and mobilization planning. In this connection PriMin is aware ROK armed forces are working on concept of 30-division force by early 1970’s which involves converting rear area security divisions to ready reserve divisions, and problem is how to get equipment for these additional ready reserve divisions. PriMin may feel that in light recent press stories on need for additional forces in Vietnam, we are preparing put pressure on ROKG for more than light division and if ROKs take initiative with generous offer, U.S. would respond in same generous vein.

5. Park’s current attitude on light division despatch and related timing consideration is not clear. National Assembly action is major consideration. Under present planning, Assembly will meet in mid-April for one month, reconvene early July for one month, and then convene in early September for year-end session. Reverberations of Blue House raid/Pueblo/Vance mission are still strong enough to make Park hesitate about going to April session for troop despatch authorization unless he can put it forward in rather elaborate context of additional American troop contribution, clear indication that ROK forces will be built up at home and as result of agreement at highest U.S.-ROK levels. If none of these factors present, believe Park would wait until July to seek authority for light division only. Nature and intensity of NK infiltration by July, and ability of ROKs to contain it, would also have important bearing on this.

6. For more precise estimate I would have to probe much further than I have been able to so far to get clear picture of what lies behind PriMin’s proposal and extent to which it is supported by President Park, and to learn Park’s current attitude toward despatch of light division only. I feel we may have to open up a line of discussion fairly soon if we are to get ROK troops of any size before end of summer. As indicated in previous para much depends on what U.S. is going to do.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. See footnote 4, Document 187.
3. Document 186.
4. See footnote 2, Document 186.