Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

186. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 8, 1968, 1045Z.

4784. Subj: Additional ROK Troops for Vietnam.

1. For second week in a row, Prime Minister deliberately raised subject of additional ROK troops for Vietnam. (See memo of conversation dated Feb 29, 1968.)² This time he began by asking whether U.S. would increase number of troops being sent to Vietnam. Ambassador said he believed we would be at level of about 525,000 men in very near future. Prime Minister said he thought that was good, but didn’t U.S. need more Korean troops. Ambassador replied that we do and that, as he had indicated a week ago, he intended to approach ROKG on this subject again soon. Had Prime Minister’s thoughts on this developed since our last mention of it, Ambassador asked.

2. The Prime Minister then outlined an elaborate scenario, indicating that he had been thinking about this subject since our last meeting, which involved the following: he said that he had excellent information to effect that within next year or so, Prime Minister Sato of Japan would request U.S. to return Okinawa to Japan. This would give Sato a political advantage he would need to stay in power and to permit U.S./Japan Defense Treaty to remain in effect after 1970. Meanwhile in Vietnam the war would be continuing, and he agreed with the Ambassador that this was a crucial year in Vietnam and there would be a continuing need for more troops to exert maximum pressure on the enemy.

3. After stressing that he was giving only his own ideas and had consulted no one, the PriMin said that an American victory in Vietnam is a victory for Korea, and an American defeat in Vietnam a defeat for the ROK. Under certain circumstances, PriMin believed, ROK might be persuaded to send an additional two divisions and perhaps more. However, this could only be managed through a meeting between President Johnson and President Park, perhaps in Hawaii. At that meeting (or perhaps beforehand) PriMin thought U.S. should state its willingness to:

(A) Provide necessary financial assistance to permit ROK to place its three ready reserve divisions, which are now fully equipped, on active duty.

(B) U.S. should then bring the seven ROK rear area security reserve divisions up to the equipment levels of regular ready reserve divisions. This could be done at an equipment cost of about nine million dollars for each division.

(C) U.S., with reversion of Okinawa in mind, should construct a large air base on Cheju-do for use by such sophisticated aircraft as the F–4.

4. If this could be done, PriMin continued, President Park would probably be willing to send two regular divisions to Vietnam, perhaps replacing these regular active duty divisions in Korea with the three activated ready reserve divisions. In addition, by following through on previous proposal to employ five thousand civilian reservists in logistical jobs in Vietnam to enable the dispatch of previously discussed light ROK division, it would then be possible to increase number of ROK troops for Vietnam by two divisions and the two-regiment light division. This would make a total of five ROK divisions in Vietnam.

5. Comment: PriMin carefully characterized foregoing as entirely his own idea, which he has discussed with no one. It seems clear, however, that from refinements contained in this presentation, and from scope of his proposal, that he has been thinking about this subject since our last meeting, and that he has quite probably discussed it with others, possibly including the President. I responded to all this by saying that we would think about this and would discuss subject with him again in near future.

6. I would appreciate your thoughts and suggestions for use in follow-up I should make on this subject. Also, questions which you would wish to have clarified in connection with it.

7. General Bonesteel has seen this message and requests copy be routed to CINCPAC.

Porter

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC. A typed copy of the telegram was forwarded to President Johnson with a March 9 memorandum from Rostow. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. V) With reference to discussing the matter with Pak, President Johnson penned at the bottom of Rostow’s memorandum, “Why not meet him in Korea—LBJ”.
2. Memorandum of conversation not found, but the conversation is summarized in telegram 4572 from Seoul, February 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27–3 VIET S)