185. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Katzenbach) to President Johnson1
Paul Nitze and I are impressed with the continuing dangers of the Korean situation. With the improvement of weather at the onset of spring, the North Koreans may well launch further infiltration forays with serious material and psychological consequences. Furthermore, any likely settlement formula at Panmunjom would probably be resented by the sensitive ROKs. We therefore believe that we should push ahead with the implementation of the Vance Recommendations, improving our own posture in respect to Korea and endeavoring to build upon the degree of trust and confidence re-established by his Mission. His recommendations fall into four broad categories which I believe can be approached as follows:
1. U.S. Posture
A. Reassessment of our policies and goals toward Korea
With the assistance of a small inter-agency group I am taking a very close look at where we are and where we should go in respect [Page 400] to both Koreas.2 I intend to submit a report on this matter by 1 May.
B. Protecting our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapon sites
Recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning personnel requirements for improving the security of our [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapons sites are currently under review in the DOD. Study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is continuing to determine whether additional physical security measures should be taken. This study will be completed by 1 April 1968.
C. Improving the Korean DMZ Barrier
Additional counterinfiltration items are being delivered to Korea with airlift of most critical items authorized. Many critical items are already in Korea. An operations analysis study in support of DMZ security and counterinfiltration efforts is in progress. Included in the FY 1968 supplement of $100 million is an additional sum, yet unspecified, for counterinfiltration items.
D. Reconnaissance Activities in Korea
General Bonesteel has been authorized to keep Ambassador Porter fully informed of all reconnaissance activities scheduled for the vicinity of Korea.
E. Communications
To improve our secure communications between Washington and Seoul, on Saturday, 20 February, a secure teleconferencing system was established connecting the Departments of State and Defense with the American Embassy and General Bonesteel’s headquarters. Also, on 20 February, the Department of Defense dispatched by air the necessary equipments and technical engineering personnel to establish a secure voice system to connect several key State and Defense facilities in Seoul, and these, in turn, with Washington.
2. Influencing South Korea
A. Defense Ministerial Meetings
We wish to arrange promptly a meeting between the ROK Ministry of National Defense and our Department of Defense, preferably in [Page 401] April in Hawaii. Paul Nitze plans to head our delegation and CINCPAC would be directly involved. This would be portrayed as a direct follow-up on the Vance Mission and would be designed to pull the ROKs closer to us and to keep the ROKG calmed down. Their desire to retaliate will inevitably increase if the North Koreans step up their raids as the weather improves.
B. Visit of Korean Prime Minister
In accordance with Vance’s recommendations, and if you approve, I wish to authorize Ambassador Porter to invite Prime Minister Chung to visit the United States this spring.3
C. Under Secretary Baird’s Visit
Under Secretary of the Navy Baird plans to visit a number of East Asian countries in April. We will include Seoul on his schedule as an additional political input.4
D. American Investment
The North Koreans have already accomplished part of their objective of diverting the ROKs from their economic effort and frightening-off foreign investment. In continuation of Vance’s efforts, we are attempting to keep the ROKs focused on economic development and endeavoring to buttress up American investment intentions. I will be in touch with George Ball on this subject.
E. Protection for President Park
The Air Force’s Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has trained and equipped the personal Presidential guards of the Heads of State of the Philippines, Bolivia, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam. In view of President Park’s intense fear over his own safety, and that of his family, we asked Ambassador Porter to offer OSI training to President Park’s personal protective force. President Park was highly appreciative of the offer and arrangements are now being made to initiate the OSI training and equipage program within the next three weeks.
3. Influencing North Korea
The Pyongyang Government is difficult to influence under any circumstances but the problem is compounded while they hold the Pueblo crew as hostages. Yet, as Vance recommended, we must endeavor [Page 402] to bring political pressure to bear on them. We have already approached the Russians about the dangers of the current Pyongyang course and our difficulties in restraining the South Koreans in face of continuing provocation. We have urged them to use what influence they have to persuade the North Koreans to agree to a reasonable settlement of the Pueblo issue and to ease tensions in the area. We have made somewhat similar approaches to the Japanese and British and will endeavor to expand our bilateral approaches to other countries. If we can obtain the release of the crew, we would be in a better position to peel off our political gloves in an effort to indict Pyongyang as a threat to peace. This might include calling a Security Council Meeting on the subject.
4. Military Assistance
Vance has made a number of military assistance recommendations including increased MAP levels in the next few years. These are under study and we will report in a separate memorandum our recommendations regarding future military assistance programs for Korea.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Memos, Vol. VI. Secret; Nodis. The report was forwarded to the President under a March 7 covering memorandum from Rostow that indicates that the President saw the memorandum.↩
- The Korean Study Group, consisting of representatives from the Department of State and the Department of Defense, held an organizational meeting on March 5 and agreed to consider adding a representative from CIA and from AID/ECON. (Memorandum for the record, March 7; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL KOR S–US) John Walsh of the Executive Secretariat wrote to Porter on March 10, advising him of Korean developments and attaching a copy of Katzenbach’s memorandum. (Ibid.)↩
- The President approved extending the invitation.↩
- An earlier version of the memorandum included the possibility that Rusk would visit Seoul following the SEATO meeting in April. (Memorandum for the President, March 4; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL KOR S–US) While in Asia for the SEATO, ANZUS, and Seven Nation meetings, Rusk met briefly with Foreign Minister Choi to discuss those meetings and bilateral issues. (Telegram 143511 to Seoul, April 8; ibid., POL 15–1 KOR S)↩