Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

374. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Plans (Nelson) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, July 12, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Air Support for Paramilitary Operations in Laos

1. This memorandum is for your information and paragraph four suggests that a meeting be held with the Department of Defense.

2. Attached is a memorandum of conversation with General Brown, new Commander of the 7th Air Force, which took place on 10 July 1968. Also attached is a brief summary table of our Laos air picture which I left with General Brown.² The briefing went well, and I think we can count on General Brown to be both helpful and cooperative within the limits of his responsibility. This question of responsibility, however, leads into General Brown’s most telling point, i.e., the limits of his power to do anything substantive for us without some definite alteration in policy directives.

3. Such an alteration is, in effect, what the Chief of Station and the Ambassador have been after for some time. It has become apparent, through voluminous correspondence on this subject and continual foot-dragging of various command channels in the military establishment, that further requests to meaningfully change the situation at the tactical level will only meet with frustration and in the end be fruitless.

4. To resolve this question, and I feel that it must be resolved if we are to effectively support the Agency’s effort in Laos, I recommend that we proceed as planned with a meeting between the DCI or you and Secretary Clifford or Mr. Nitze, and possibly the Chairman of the JCS, during which the nature of the air support problem would be exposed along with the need for a higher priority in support of irregular operations in Laos. If, during these discussions, it can be resolved that a higher priority can be given to provide at least a minimum of sustained support to our operations in Laos, a special SIG meeting may not be necessary.³

William E. Nelson

⁴

Attachment A⁵

Washington, July 11, 1968.

Memorandum for the Record

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Lt. General George S. Brown

1. On 10 July 1968 CFE and ACFE/TBL met with General Brown, successor to General Momyer as Commander of the 7th Air Force. General Brown will assume his new duties in late July 1968, and our visit was to acquaint him with problems which have arisen in connection with air support for CIA operations in Laos.

2. General Brown did not recall having been previously briefed in detail on the Station’s paramilitary operations in Laos, so the meeting began by CFE giving a general rundown on the two wars being waged by CIA irregulars in North and South Laos. Apart from the overall picture, it was specifically pointed out to General Brown that effective and timely marrying of ground irregular forces and tactical air support had the distinct advantage of enabling the irregulars to inflict heavy damage on the enemy which he could not do with his own portable firepower. With air artillery to count on, the irregulars could take on more sizeable targets and have an effect on enemy capabilities disproportionate to their relatively small numbers.

3. CIA’s most pressing concern at this time is that of being unable to obtain sustained commitments of air support for these operations in Laos. Without such commitments, their effectiveness is considerably reduced. We recognized the higher priorities of the American effort in Vietnam and the difficulties in diverting aircraft from these priorities to support the irregular war in Laos. If, however, a minimum level of support could be provided on a regular and continuing basis, it would make a significant difference in an effort which is related to that in Vietnam.

4. General Brown commented that he was sympathetic to our needs, was aware of our problem, and he realized Ambassador Sullivan was already “laying in wait” for him regarding this subject. He felt that there was no excuse for the Air Force not to meet commitments that had been made, particularly in terms of operations which had been predicated on commitment of just such air support. He went on to add that he would do everything in his power to see that any such commitments which had been made were met. He noted, however, that until the priorities were changed, and he was instructed accordingly, support to the effort in Laos would remain a low priority as it had been in the past, a fact which he is powerless to change even as Commander of the 7th Air Force.

5. General Brown was shown a copy of the CINCPAC cable directing additional helicopter support for CIA operations as soon as helicopters could be positioned. He was also advised that a recommendation by the JCS had been moved forward which called for positioning additional aircraft in the Theater to support a level of tactical air missions up to 65 per day for CIA operations. General Brown replied that he had serious doubts that, given budgetary and other prevailing considerations, any additional aircraft would be allocated for our purposes. If such aircraft were provided, however, he could readily insure meeting air support requirements on a continuing basis for our operations. He felt it would be unwise for us to get our hopes up on the point of additional aircraft for tactical air support.

6. General Brown was asked what he thought could be done here in Washington to break this impasse. He replied that a new decision allocating priorities would have to be made which would elevate the priority of CIA operations in Laos. While this might eventually require a decision at the SIG level, a move which might have an initial effect would be for the DCI to expose the problem to Secretary Nitze and the JCS. If agreement could be reached at this level, a decision might be forthcoming which would provide for at least a minimum dedication of sustained air support for CIA operations in Laos.

7. Closing the meeting, General Brown agreed to do everything possible to help our efforts in Laos. He was encouraged to discuss these matters with the Chief of Station who is looking forward to seeing him. General Brown emphasized once more, however, that until directions came from Washington that the effort in Laos be given a higher priority, the chances were slim for CIA getting more air support than that being currently provided.

Stuart Methven ⁶

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files, Job 79–207A. Box 1, Folder 7. Secret. Sent through the Deputy Director for Plans.
2. Attached, but not printed.
3. No record of these meetings has been found.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Nelson signed the original.
5. Drafted by Methven on July 11.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates Methven signed the original.