Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

373. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 21, 1968, 0541Z.

7356. Subj: Dry season wrap-up. Country Team message.

I. Summary

1. Rains have recently been falling steadily throughout Laos ending dry season which saw enemy aggressively retake much of territory picked up by FAR in past two years. This seems an appropriate time for Country Team to assess results of enemy offensive and make some tentative judgements on where we and they might go from here.

2. Enemy has taken from FAR substantial pieces of territory in north and northeast, considerably bruising regular and irregular units in the process. Route of FAR force at Nam Bac and capture of most paramilitary bases north of PDJ puts enemy in much better position in these areas than one year ago. In south, enemy territorial rains have been less extensive, however, in MR IV enemy has significantly increased control over area around Saravane thereby improving his capability to move through western fringe of Ho Chi Minh Trail structure. In most areas of south Laos FAR units have been forced by enemy pressure to move into defensive alignments around major population centers, leaving many agricultural areas relatively unprotected. Enemy raids in these areas have seriously hampered USAID and other rural development activities. Enemy maintains capability to attack simultaneously Saravane, Lao Ngam and Attopeu.

3. At moment, enemy appears to possess sufficient strength to protect his holdings and, if he wishes, pick up additional terrain in some areas. However, enemy activity has diminished in past weeks as weather has deteriorated, giving at least preliminary indication that enemy may follow rainy season tactic of past years and concentrate on protecting and consolidating his holdings while increasing harassment of friendly-held areas through raids and ambushes. At this early juncture, this can be only tentative appraisal and situation will require careful observation during coming weeks.

4. In past years, FAR has used its rainy-season logistical advantage (airlift) to take ground from enemy. Thut rainy season, major offensive moves by FAR regular and irregular troops would not seem prudent unless current conditions change markedly. Many FAR units are under-strength and, although most units are adequately equipped and provisioned, morale is not good and unit effectiveness in battle situations is uncertain at any given moment. At present it would appear that FAR regular and irregular troops should concentrate, in general, on holding line against possible further enemy encroachment. More vulnerable enemy salients might be hit under right conditions but major offensive action would not appear feasible.

[Here follow sections II. Roundup of Dry-Season Action, III. Enemy Capacity, IV. Friendly Capacity, and V. Prognosis.]

Hurwitch

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris for Ambassador Sullivan, Saigon, JCS,CINCPAC, COMUSMACV, Seventh AF, and DIA.