339. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
5021. 1. I discovered, in recent SEACOORD meeting,2 that there is not a clear understanding in all quarters of relationship which Souvanna sees between recent enemy military activity in south Laos and potential introduction of U.S. forces into Lao Panhandle. There was some disposition to assume that, because North Vietnamese not only clearly violating Lao territory, but also threatening population centers, Souvanna would have less objection to U.S. forces coming into Panhandle at this time.
2. This assessment overlooks the shrewd and ruthless blackmail factor which has been a deliberate element of recent enemy activity in South Laos. This element has manifested itself by the enemy tactic of surrounding such significant population centers as Saravane and Attopeu, making obvious their clear capacity to take and destroy these exposed salients of governmental control. At the same time, their allies, such as Soviets and Poles, busily pass word that these centers will not be taken because they were not in Pathet Lao hands in 1962.
3. Patent implication of these statements is that enemy will respect government control over these cities provided no intrusion made into areas of their control. In shorthand, introduction of U.S. troops across SVN-Laos border would mean RLG loss of Saravane and Attopeu.
[Page 664]4. Therefore, from Souvanna’s viewpoint, a putative U.S. request to introduce ground forces into territory which he does not control to fight enemy which he doubts U.S. can fix and destroy would have to be balanced against permanent loss and probable destruction of two cities currently under his control which he has no doubt enemy could take at will.
5. Ergo, current enemy pressures in South Laos have not weakened Souvanna’s resolve to resist introduction of U.S. forces into Panhandle, but rather have been deliberately and rather cleverly designed to enhance that resolve.
6. I do not wish suggest from foregoing that blackmail against these two cities is only issue which keeps Souvanna from welcoming U.S. ground force intervention in Laos. As Dept is aware, his objections to such intervention are based upon many considerations of long standing and reasoned convictions. However, I believe it is important to place a proper perspective on the relationship between current crises and prevailing convictions.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, London, Moscow, and CINCPAC.↩
- March 7; see attachment to Document 345.↩