Office of the Historian

338. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

Saigon, March 3, 1968, 0323Z.

MAC 02985. 1. (TS) The situation in Laos is rapidly becoming critical. Attopeu and Saravane may fall as well as the Bolovens Plateau. Pakse is threatened which would allow the enemy egress to the Mekong. Ho Chi Minh is taking steps that bear out his design on all SEA.

2. (TS) It is time to consider a strategy that is broad enough to counter the total threat of NVN to SEA. SEATO Plan 62 provides a concept of operations that can be refined to meet the current exigencies.

3. (TS) Some of the advantages of this approach are:

A.
NVN would be countered under international aegis. This could have a broad psychological impact.
B.
Greater options would be available in the battle for SEA.
C.
The SEATO powers would be involved.
D.
The President would have a broader basis for his policies.
E.
It would permit US forces to enter Laos under international colors by request of Laotian Govt.
F.
Cambodia would be isolated and Sihanouk may give support to SEATO.

4. (TS) Disadvantages are:

A.
Broadens war and US commitment to SEA.
B.
Partial mobilization of both personnel and industry would probably be required.
C.
Possibility of strong public reaction in the US.
D.
Possibility ChiCom intervention.
E.
Time involved.
F.
Combined staff will compound command and control problems.

5. (TS) Specifically, US/SEATO field forces at the request of the RLG could go through Thailand to seize key areas in Laos such as the Bolovens Plateau. Aggressive action could be taken along the road and trail complex to disrupt the flow of NVA troops and supplies. I feel that Souvanna Phouma would be amenable to the implementation of a SEATO Plan or a similar plan sponsored by another international group.

6. (TS) Although there are practical problems and foreseeable difficulties in an attempt to use the SEATO organization, I feel the situation is [Page 663] such that this course of action should be seriously considered. Our approach should be to back an international group with the purpose of saving SEA as opposed to unilateral action to save a weak SVN Government. SEATO was originated for this purpose.

7. This concept was discussed by me with Amb. Bunker on 2 March. His political staff has it under study. It will be debated at the SEACOORD meeting on 7 March.3

  1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 Mar-31 Mar 1968. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Wheeler.↩
  2. SEATO Plan 6 envisioned a SEATO military force defending Laos by seizure of strategic areas.↩
  3. See the attachment to Document 345.↩