Office of the Historian

324. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, December 20, 1967, 0603Z.

3052. Ref: A) State 76627.2 B) Vientiane 2998.3 C) State 78120.2

1.
I saw Souvanna this morning and obtained his concurrence in Arc Light overflights of Laos. He stipulated certain conditions and limitations which will be spelled out in following paragraphs.
2.
On night-time overflights for strikes in Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, he asked that planes be instructed to fly at high altitudes, that they enter Laos on a corridor north of Pakse but south of Savanna-khet and that they avoid overflight of population centers such as Saravane. This would seem to pose no serious problems and my air attaché will be in touch with MACV to work out details.
3.
On day-time overflights for strikes in NVN and SVN he was a little more skittish and asked whether we could avoid mass formation overflights with ostentatious contrails. I said I would look into this, but undertook no commitments. He did not press it further, so I consider his statement stands in the form of a desideratum rather than a condition. It seems to me that his desideratum would be met if strike missions are flown in cells of three, which I gather is normal practice.
4.
On daylight strikes in Laos itself, he had problems. He felt that strikes and flights could be easily correlated and he would have hard time justifying Arc Light missions as “reconnaissance activity.” He therefore asked that daylight strikes [on?] Lao soil, when needed, enter and withdraw over eastern frontiers.
5.
Comment: I feel this package fulfills essential requirements ref A. As for execution time, he said we could begin tonight if we want. The limitation on routes will add nothing more than a few minutes to any conceivable operation. The limitation on those rare daylight strikes in Laos will add a maximum of about one hour to best conceivable response time and perhaps two hours to entire mission. However, fleeting target situations on Lao soil have been so seldom that this should pose no real burden on our forces.
Sullivan
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC,CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV.↩
  2. See footnote 3, Document 320.↩
  3. Document 320.↩