Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

320. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 30, 1967, 1325Z.

2998. Ref: State 76627.²

1. Although [garble—instructions?] contained reftel may be subject to different interpretations, I suppose it would be appropriate for me to assume that “authorizations” and “decisions” described therein are still subject to rudimentary reconciliation with the vestigial shreds of Lao sovereignty. Therefore, I will discuss the matter with Souvanna and feel confident I can obtain most of what is desired.

2. Before doing so, however, I feel it pertinent to refresh Washington memories on certain aspects of this matter. In particular, I wish to recall that my “suggestion” about the period of “diplomatic curiosity” arose from the fact that the Soviets had protested to Souvanna about U.S. intentions to overfly Laos with B–52s. Our pattern at that time was intended to permit him with honesty to tell the Soviets that B–52s were not overflying Laos, but at the same time, preserve the option of that eventuality when heat was off him.

3. I also wish to point out that requirement for [garble—cover?] strikes in Vietnam arose entirely because public relations offices of Strategic Air Command felt it necessary to announce each Arc Light mission executed by their resources. If cover strikes are to be discontinued, I assume I am correct in understanding last sentence of para 5³ to mean that this public relations policy will also be discontinued and that no announcements will be made concerning Arc Light missions in Laos. Please confirm.

4. Paragraph 4 states that “optimum force utilization in SEA may require daylight strikes.” As Washington aware, daylight strikes into easternmost areas of Laos have been authorized for some time for those missions entering Lao airspace from the east. The most sensitive feature of this proposed package will be this question of daylight strikes. It therefore may (and probably will) mean that Souvanna’s acceptance of daylight strikes in Laos will be predicated on condition that these missions enter and withdraw from Lao airspace across the eastern frontiers of Laos.

5. I will seek appointment with Souvanna soonest and report results.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, and COMUSMACV.
2. See footnote 2, Document 318.
3. The last sentence of paragraph 5 of telegram 76627 reads: “You should inform Souvanna that we continue to refuse to discuss details of operations publicly.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S) In joint State-Defense telegram 78120 to Vientiane, December 1, Sullivan was informed that he could tell Souvanna that there will be no public announcements of Arc Light missions in Laos.” (Ibid.)