Office of the Historian

315. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1

Washington, October 20, 1967, 2331Z.

59769. For Sullivan from Katzenbach. In recent list of possible actions to accelerate war effort,2 JCS proposed several which involve Laos. We are obviously going to look hard and long at each one before moving.

The actions suggested included:

1.
Increase air interdiction in Laos and along NVN borders—selective bombing of Lao waterways traffic, special saturation bombing interdiction airstrike zones in Laos; e.g., NW of DMZ, Nape and Mu Gia passes.
2.
Eliminate operational restrictions on B–52s with regard to Laos—allow overflights of Laos by day or night, by B–52s to or from targets in Laos and Viet-Nam; allow daylight bombing in Laos; eliminate requirement for cover strikes in SVN when bombing targets in Laos; allow limited penetration Lao airspace during approach to and withdrawal from targets outside Laos.
3.
Expand Prairie Fire operations in Laos—consider limited increase in size of teams, but not approve MACV request for battalion sized units; authorize Westmoreland and Sullivan to work out specific case-by-case extension of Prairie Fire area.

I know you have heard these ideas before. But since they are likely to come up again in near future, would appreciate your private thoughts through this channel on above moves soon as possible.3

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Nodis; No Distribution Outside Department. Drafted by Richard C. Holbrooke (U), cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Katzenbach.↩
  2. As suggested in the appendix to JCSM–55–67, October 17, 1967, “Increased Pressure on North Vietnam,” which McNamara sent to President Johnson on October 18. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Not found.↩