Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

314. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 21, 1967, 11:30 a.m.–12:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos and Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
• Ambassador Khamking Souvanlasy

The Secretary said he felt he had to ask the Prime Minister one question even though he knew the answer the Prime Minister would give him. We believe that we have a direct, clear, and simple commitment from the Soviets with respect to Laos. This is the result of the meeting between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev. It is an understanding that affects the totality of our relations with the Soviet Union. Did the Prime Minister believe that there was one chance in a thousand that the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos would be respected by North Vietnam before a settlement took place in Vietnam?²

The Prime Minister replied that he did not think there was such a chance; in his many conversations with the Soviets on Laos he had always stressed that the question of Laos was settled in Geneva in 1962, that Laos has nothing to do with the Vietnam question. He said the Soviets never answered directly, but always advised him to be patient, his problem would be settled as soon as the problem of Vietnam was settled. The Secretary pointed out that Vietnam had not been considered at all in the 1962 Agreement. The Prime Minister concurred and added that the North Vietnamese had violated the agreement immediately after it was signed and had, in fact, never pulled back their troops.

The Prime Minister said Moscow was well aware of the fact that North Vietnam had an absolute need to use Lao territory for infiltrating into South Vietnam. He said he had pointed out to Moscow that he had requested the United States to intervene in Laos because of this violation of the 1962 Agreement by North Vietnam; if North Vietnam had not violated the agreements there would have been no need for US assistance. He had repeatedly stressed to the Soviets, he said, that US aid was requested after large-scale fighting broke out in North Laos. As far back as the middle of 1963, he added, North Vietnam had ordered the Pathet Lao ministers to leave Vientiane on the grounds that it was not safe there; this was a lie—at the time all was calm in Vientiane. The real reason for the order was that North Vietnam felt the Lao factions were getting close to an agreement among themselves and if such an agreement were reached the Royal Lao Government would control all the territory then occupied by the Pathet Lao, thereby hampering North Vietnamese passage through Laos. (The Prime Minister seems to have forgotten that the assassination of the Foreign Minister in April 1963 triggered the abrupt departure of the two Pathet Lao ministers.)

The Secretary said that he felt the fact that Russia has never denied the existence of a specific agreement on Laos could be useful one day. The Prime Minister said if we could get the Soviet Union to tell Hanoi to leave Laos alone just as Hanoi wanted the United States to leave Vietnam alone, then there might be some hope for Laos.

The Secretary asked the Prime Minister if North Vietnamese helicopters were ever observed over Laos. The Prime Minister said the North Vietnamese have only Soviet helicopters and they do not have sufficient range to fly over Laos.

The Prime Minister said that in 1964 he had asked Peking and Hanoi for a declaration of their respective policies toward Laos but had been unsuccessful in obtaining one. He had no difficulty, however, in obtaining a statement about US policy from Ambassador Unger.

The Prime Minister said the only way for Laos to have peace is for the North Vietnamese to go home. He added that their presence in Laos was simply a matter of socialist expansion, when he tells the Soviets and other socialist countries that they are interfering in Laos, they tell him that the United States is interfering in Vietnam. The Prime Minister said he must constantly repeat that Vietnam had nothing to do with Laos.

The Secretary wondered if it would be advantageous to obtain from a number of Asian governments a declaration of policy regarding Laos similar to the declaration of 1962; he had in mind countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan, and Pakistan. He said that although some countries were reluctant to take a stand on Vietnam, they might not hesitate to take a stand on Laos. He added that we did not conceive of peace in South Vietnam as opening the way for further North Vietnamese aggression into Laos. The Prime Minister said he did not believe the North Vietnamese would dare attack Laos after peace had been restored in Vietnam. Laos is attacked now, he said, because North Vietnam needed to use Lao territory in infiltrating South Vietnam.

The Prime Minister said that North Vietnam was to a very large extent still glorying in its victory at Dien Bien Phu, still considering itself invincible. The Secretary said that for the past week or ten days Hanoi has been increasingly negative and harsh and expressed the hope that he and the Prime Minister would maintain close contact in order to ascertain North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese intentions. The Prime Minister said he would do all he could to develop more specific information, but said that the North Vietnamese Charge d’Affaires in Vientiane was very quiet. He added that Hanoi’s recent harshness might conceal an intention to accept some form of arrangement. The Secretary asked if the Prime Minister felt that Hanoi’s decisions were being affected by internal strife among North Vietnamese leaders. The Prime Minister said he did not think such internal factors were at work in Hanoi, that under their socialist regime decisions were made collectively. The Secretary asked if under such a system six or eight leaders sat around a table and one of them dissented, did that not make him a traitor in the eyes of the others and render his expression of opinion much more difficult? The Prime Minister recalled that when he was at Khang Khay, discussions would go on for a very long time and if, at the end of a meeting, the Pathet Lao leaders had not reached an agreement, they would simply close the meeting and resume it the next day. Sometimes discussions would go on for two weeks or a month until a consensus had been obtained.³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Drafted by Toumayan and Slutz and approved in S on November 5. The meeting was held at Blair House. The time of the end of the meeting is from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Prior to this meeting Vice President Humphrey met Souvanna at 11 a.m. at Blair House. Souvanna and Humphrey discussed bombing policy against North Vietnam and rice production in Laos. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS–US)
2. Rusk and Souvanna also talked during the dinner on the evening of October 20. Rusk asked Souvanna if he had any contact with Souphanouvong, and Souvanna replied only a long letter several months ago rehashing standard Pathet Lao positions. When asked by the Deputy Administrator, Rutherford Poat, who was also at the dinner, if Laos would return to a tripartite government if the civil war ended, Souvanna answered heatedly that it would not be the case. (Memorandum of conversation, October 20, 8 p.m.; ibid., POL 7 LAOS)
3. At 12:15 p.m., October 21, during a conversation before lunch, Rostow asked Souvanna for his impressions of the United Nations. Souvanna answered that he feared it would go the way of the League of Nations. As for Vietnam, the United Nations could not be much help as North and South Vietnam and the PRC were not members. Souvanna recommended a coalition government with the NLF for South Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, October 21; ibid.)