Office of the Historian

303. Central Intelligence Agency Information Report1

[document number not declassified]
July 29, 1967.

SUBJECT

  • The improved position of General Vang Pao’s forces operating in the second military region between the latter part of the dry season and the first part of the rainy season; situation appraisal as of 26 July 1967

ACQ

  • [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

SOURCE

  • A staff officer of this organization. This [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] appraisal of the current situation [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is not an official judgment by this agency or any component. It represents the observations and interpretations of a staff officer based on information available to him at the time of its preparation.

1. Summary: An analysis of the enemy’s tactical posture in the Lao Armed Forces second military region of northern Laos as of 26 July 1967 reveals that the enemy was only able to take one significant piece of terrain from the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government during the dry season of October 1966 to July 1967. This limited success [Page 607] put the enemy in control of the Nong Khang (VH–0581) area but this gain was far short of the objectives which the enemy had reportedly set for himself in his 1966/1967 dry season offensive. This lack of enemy success has resulted in a tactical shift in the balance of power in the second military region in favor of the regular and irregular forces of the Royal Lao Government under General Vang Pao. As a result of this shift the Royal Lao Government has the opportunity to exercise several offensive options in the second military region during the 1967 rainy season. The successful implementation of these options could contribute to permanently changing the tactical balance of power in northern Laos in favor of the Royal Lao Government. This success by the Royal Lao Government is attributed to General Vang Pao’s improved intelligence apparatus and the fact that it has furnished him with information he could use to hit the enemy with spoiling attacks in staging areas. Individual members of Vang Pao’s regular and guerrilla forces have come to realize they have developed a tactical superiority over the enemy during the past dry season and their morale has improved accordingly. They know from experience that they can successfully defend their position against North Vietnamese Army regulars and that air support and other assistance is close by when they need it. As Vang Pao’s units take the offensive during this current rainy season, they can be expected to expand outward from existing positions in Houa Phan Province. This will include attacks designed to retake Nong Khang. This appraisal updates the previous appraisal [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the lack of enemy military successes in Hou Phan and Xieng Khouang Provinces during the 1966–1967 dry season.2

[Here follows the 9-page report.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVII, Cables, 2/67–12/67. Confidential.↩
  2. Dated April 22. (Ibid.)↩