Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

302. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, July 29, 1967, 0930Z.

543. Eyes only Bundy from Sullivan. Ref: State 13477.²

1. Thanks for the red flag in reftel. I realize tone of three messages³ you cite was harsh and assure you that they were deliberately so phrased after rather lengthy consideration. There are two reasons for this.

2. First reason is that military commands as matter deliberate practice seek expand upon and nibble away at restrictions imposed upon them by policy decision. This is a game at the colonel level and continues unabated if met only with gentle demurrers. Unfortunately, these colonels serve only one year duty tours, have no background of history and no future of responsibility. An occasional nasty-gram raised the matter in an attention-arresting way to command levels in an effort to remind commanders that they have policy responsibility even if subordinates ignore it. I realize this skims off some of my popularity rating, but it does usually result in corrective action.

3. The second, and perhaps more compelling, reason is a tactical one which has developed around the Department’s suggestion for a SEACOORD meeting. Since the subject of the meeting is a rehash of old proposals which were rightfully turned down in Washington last May, Department’s failure to turn them down this time is being interpreted by the military as indication that you have weakened on these points and have passed the buck out here to me. Since I have the ill-deserved reputation of being more “realistic” than you fuzzy fellows in Foggy Bottom, they have assumed I would be a patsy for their proposals. I happen to think their proposals are very poorly conceived and have served notice by my three messages that I am going to be most negative in this regard.

4. While it may be that, for tactical reasons, it was prudent for you to delay your decisions on this matter until after a SEACOORD meeting, you and Nick must realize that it has made you look soft on these matters and is going to require me to look hard. If, as I trust, you are still with me in principle, you are going to have to begin looking tough also. I realize it doesn’t suit the dignity of State to use quite such tactless language as I have resorted to, but a good firm tone on occasion will close the apparent chinks and crannies.

5. As you will realize, I feel very strongly about this because I believe we are once again facing a crucial decision in principle which it might be tempting to sweep under the carpet by what appears to be a minor concession in practice. To my mind the point at issue is not whether Westy or I will control and direct the irregular troops we use in the corridor. (I happen to have more and better ones than he can muster, but that is irrelevant.) It is not even a question whether Souvanna would quit if we abandon clandestine levels and move overly into Laos. (I really believe he will, and for tactical reasons, his quitting could make good sense to him.)

6. His quitting would not only face us with the whole dreary cycle we went through once before with General Phoumi (this time it would probably be Kouprasith) but, more importantly, it would change the whole name of the game. We would have to accept overt responsibility for the defense of Laos. I am not exaggerating when I say this would require 200,000 U.S. troops. Worse still, it would be at no net advantage to our position in South Vietnam.

7. But, beyond this, we would throw the Soviets right out of the ball game. I may be wrong, but (as you know) I have always maintained that the only way we will get out of this Southeast Asian engagement is by the Soviets moving to persuade North Vietnam to negotiate, after having accepted the responsibility towards Hanoi and the price towards China which this would entail. The U.S.-Soviet agreement on Laos is the stepping stone towards Soviet action on this front. So long as we keep our fighting in Laos clandestine and covert, the Soviets tolerate it. If it becomes overt, they quit and withdraw their stepping stone.

8. Now, of all times, is not the time to do this. Civil war seems about to start in China. Sihanouk may be in the process of a change. Hanoi may be having its second thoughts. The Soviets themselves may be shaping up to a move. To kick all this away in favor of a military move which has questionable value (and which in my judgement would boomerang militarily) seems less than statesmanlike.

9. Moreover, in purely military terms, Westy’s move would accomplish very little at best. The Viets have already set up a new logistics system in Cambodia which would absorb the loss of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The overwhelming proportion of infiltrated personnel are now moving straight across the DMZ rather than through Laos. Our CAS controlled forces in the Panhandle are on the point of a major take-off in the very territory MACV would like to take over. If they would assign 50 propeller-driven aircraft to work regularly with our assets in the Panhandle, we could clean up those routes and dry up those base areas twelve months of the year.

10. Our military friends are getting a juggernaut complex. With John McNaughton and Des FitzGerald gone, we have to count on a few like you and Nick to keep an eye on the political objective and not let it become lost in the flailings of military expedience. It would be very reassuring if you can reassert your touch with the holy grail.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Exdis; No Distribution Outside Department.
2. In telegram 13477 to Vientiane, July 27, William Bundy informed Sullivan that the tone of telegram 433 (Document 301) as well as two other cables, had caused offense in the Department of State and might also have caused offense with the other addressees as well. Bundy reported that “we value your judgment too much to see its effectiveness impaired by its manner of expression.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 1 ASIA SE–US)
3. One of the other messages was telegram 484 from Vientiane to CINCPAC, July 26, in which Sullivan complained that a Prairie Fire Spike Team had captured two Lao civilian fishermen and removed them to South Vietnam where they were interrogated and detained because they had seen a member of the Spike Team. Sullivan pointedly asked how CINCPAC planned to return the civilians to Laos “without running even a greater risk of compromising the program than had you permitted them to continue fishing.” (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) The other message, related to Document 301, has not been further identified.