Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

280. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk at the American Chiefs of State Conference, Punta del Este, Uruguay¹

Washington, April 13, 1967, 2:51 p.m.

Tosec 124. In course conversation yesterday, Dobrynin made official demarche to Kohler about Laos.² Talking points paper given Kohler contained following points: (1) present developments in Laos causing alarm in Moscow; (2) fundamental reason for acuteness internal Lao situation is increased US interference in internal affairs that country; (3) US actions contradict obligations under Geneva Agreements; (4) US trying convert Laos into new theater military operations; (5) US participating in effort liquidate tripartite system internal organization; (6) all US and right-wing actions aimed at creation single military and political front against Pathet Lao; (7) US conducting heavy air raids on Lao territory; (8) US violating Lao air space to raid DRV; (9) as Co-Chairman Geneva Conference, Sov Govt directs USG attention to fact present political course with respect to Laos may have serious consequences not only for peace and unity in Laos, but also for security all SEA; and (10) Sov Union insists US immediately cease violating neutrality Laos, discontinue intervention including air activities and strictly observe Geneva Agreements; otherwise it will not be possible create conditions necessary reestablish peace and quiet in Laos.

Kohler told him he would pass statement along for study and would reserve formal comment until later.³ As preliminary comment, however, Kohler said it was useful subject should come up. USG considered Soviets had not fulfilled their responsibilities under 1962 Laos agreements and related understandings between Pushkin and Harriman and that their failure to do so was one of main reasons which had led to escalation of hostilities in SVN. If all Laos had been effectively brought under control Central Government with aid and support of Co-Chairmen and ICC, main invasion route into SVN from NVN would not have remained open. Kohler concluded with statement that Soviet Govt should understand we consider they have continuing responsibility this connection.

Dobrynin noted preliminary remarks and said he would expect fuller and more considered reply after his return from Moscow. He departs today.

British received Soviet proposal yesterday in Moscow that Co-Chairman send message to Geneva signatories apparently long line above demarche. Will send text when available.

Katzenbach

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted and approved by John P. Walsh of S/S. Repeated to Moscow, London, Vientiane, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, and Saigon.
2. The memorandum of the conversation between Dobrynin and Kohler, April 12, at the Soviet Embassy, is ibid., POL US–USSR.
3. In Secto 55 from Punta del Este, April 14, Rusk responded that since Dobrynin brought up Laos, “we should jump into this for all it is worth.” Rusk asked that upon his return to Washington William Bundy, Harriman, and others prepare a “major presentation to the Soviets about Laos, pressing for 1000 percent compliance by all parties with the Geneva Accords of 1962.” Rusk noted that if Dobrynin’s demarche meant “more trouble ahead, let’s have a good record.” If there was any possibility of getting effective application of the 1962 Accord, Rusk believed it would be a “major step.” (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)