Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

279. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 25, 1967, 0850Z.

5248. Ref: State 144166.² For Bundy from Sullivan.

1. I take note of highest level decision that we should extend scope of Shining Brass rules to:

A) Add new northern zone of approximately 20 kms depth

B) Permit helicopter penetration to full depth

C) Allow exploitation forces and multi-platoon operations to three platoons in any single operation to full depth.

2. First, let me say that, subject to my comments below, I think we can live with this decision. At the same time, let me add that I believe this is just about all the traffic will bear and that the line has to be held at this point. I think it is important that this be clearly stated at the outset because this new zone embraces some very hot territory where three platoons could be lost in a 30-minute fire fight some fine morning. At that stage, there will be a panicky demand for a battalion to “rescue them.” This will have to be resisted and the risks and losses will have to be borne as part of the original contractual understanding.

3. Next, I would like certain clarifications:

A) This zone covers the FAR position at Ban Houei Sane occupied by Lao Bao Batallion BV–33. We will want to work out some operating rules to guide any activities contemplated near this area.

B) It is not clear whether use of helicopters and exploitation forces involves “full depth” of new zone or of entire Shining Brass zone. Please stipulate.

C) Are three platoons to be committed simultaneously or consecutively? In other words, is there a limit on total consecutive commitment to an operation?

4. Re point 2e reftel. I wish to have “coordination” spelled out to mean continuation of our current system. We have periodic meetings with MACV which work out their programs, we have “intent to launch” rules, etc. We want these preserved and not changed. This includes possibility I may veto some operations for political reasons as I have in the past. I intend continue exercise that right as senior U.S. representative in Laos. I believe Admiral Sharp would prefer it that way so that his field forces are not operative without some exercise of political judgment.

5. Your understanding of Souvanna’s attitude outlined first sentence para 4 reftel is correct. There is, in my judgment, absolutely no chance that he will change this position. This is a matter of major political posture, in his view, and not affected by tactical circumstances.

6. Therefore, it would not be possible for me even to consider approaching him either to “beseech his understanding” or to tell him coldly that we have decided to go ahead in any event. His answer could only be negative in any instance. He has let me know obliquely that if thing ever came to this sort of point he would not wish to be informed in any way.

7. Consequently, my judgment is quite clear that I will have to bear the full responsibility for this sort of operation without sharing it with Souvanna. This I am prepared to do.

8. However, in so doing, I feel I am entitled to complete cover from Washington and other assorted spokesmen in public relations field. I recognize and accept that Washington cannot buy the line of flat denial, which is what Souvanna would want. At the same time, I see absolutely no reason to go beyond the “no comment” stage.

9. Consequently, in rather elaborate discussion of press handling in para 5 reftel, I take inalterable exception to idea of “deep backgrounding responsible press reps”. I would like assurance that this will not be given further consideration and that no official will, in any circumstance, acknowledge these operations even if “incidents lead to publicity.” It is good for a spokesman’s moral fibre to learn to stand on “no comment”.

10. Finally, I wish to stress continuing need for rigid precautions against “inadvertent” disclosure by casual talk, by letters which are sent to next of kin after fatalities, etc. The men who run and operate this program are an elite group of volunteers with an excellent record of discipline and absence of self-seeking publicity. It would be a total disservice to them and their mission if their operations were slipped out because some public information official or staff section can not maintain the same discipline in its far less demanding function.³

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 4:40 p.m., February 25, Washington time.
2. Document 277.
3. In joint State-Defense telegram 147744 to JCS, Saigon, and Vientiane, March 2, the Departments of Defense and State outlined press guidance for questions about Shining Brass. The guidance stated that if the inquiry arose from a Communist accusation, the spokesperson should decline comment. If the incident occurred close to the SVN border (about 5 kilometers) and became public, the spokesperson could suggest that it was an inadvertent border crossing or pursuit of NVN/VC. Search and rescue activities could also be used as a explanation when appropriate, but otherwise the response must be “no comment.” There would be no “background” or “off the record” briefings on Shining Brass, nor would operations be disclosed to official personnel except on a “need to know basis.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)