Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

269. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 18, 1966, 1135Z.

3116. For Country Director Laos. Dept also pass USAID, USIA, DOD, CIA.

1. In anticipation your interdepartmental review of situation in Laos and of our policies toward this troubled, strategically placed Kingdom, we must admit that even from our vantage point we view future as most unpredictable. This sense of caution has been installed in us by very recent experiences. Last June (Embtel 1371)² during visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger it was consensus of Lao, and of foreign observers as well, that there had been marked progress on military and rural development fronts coupled with attainment of relative political and economic stability. All this seemed to augur well for continued progress, however slow, toward objectives we share with Lao that they achieve true independence and prosperity despite their precarious geographic position and their continuing confrontation with North Vietnamese aggression.

2. Since June we have witnessed a succession of events, some unheralded, some inherent in earlier developments, which have dealt damaging blows to these expectations. Statisticians will dispute placing any monetary value on effects of Mekong flood in September, but by conservative estimates damage to rice and other crops, to roads, and to buildings, plus loss of labor and resources which otherwise could have been applied to constructive enterprises, must reach in neighborhood 20 to 25 million dollars. In economy so relatively unproductive and marginal as that of Laos, this is loss which will be felt for at least two years.

3. Political currents since June have been as unpredictable as those of the Mekong. A National Assembly was dissolved because neither Souvanna Phouma, nor his young and old opponents in Assembly, sought the compromise of their differences which was always within reach. As a result, elections are again in offing with uncertain outcome and with widespread doubt that they should even be held. Predictions of any sort as to their results are hazardous. There followed ouster by Neutralist Colonels of General Kong Le, whose effectiveness as a leader had steadily deteriorated during past several years as result of a failure to command, a loss of self-confidence, and personal excesses. No sooner had he taken refuge in Thailand than General Ma bombed several military sites in Vientiane in a futile, senseless, and self-destructive attempt to settle what he regarded as crucial odds with Generals Kouprasith, Oudone, et al.

4. Reason applied to these developments can only retire in confusion, but the tolerant Buddhist view of life and destiny which most Lao share probably permits them to accept these events as beyond any power to alter or control. They thus probably look to the future undismayed by the past.

5. We have little alternative but to do likewise, setting our course as best we can in an uncharted future. But there are certain stars to steer by.

(A) First is premise that it is essential that Mekong Valley, together with most other territories now under RLG control in Laos, be retained in friendly hands. This implies continued military and paramilitary assistance to Laos as long as enemy actions make them necessary. At current levels these commitments reach some 140 million dollars per year but involve only a handful of US military personnel and a minimum of US prestige. Since any substantial escalation of the war in Laos would have serious political (and possibly military) drawbacks, we think our military involvement is at about its most practical level in relation to present enemy threat and our political objectives. This level of assistance is in our judgement indispensable and irreducible.

(B) Second is our conviction that as a small, landlocked, undeveloped country with powerful neighbors Laos is most likely to enjoy prosperity in a status of neutrality guaranteed if possible by outside powers. This concept underlay Geneva Agreements of 1962 and despite NVN and other violations it remains in our judgement a valid prescription for Laos. Present de facto division of country could end in formalization of two Lao states, one under Communist control, but friendly Lao still nourish hope that reconciliation with NLHS will be possible if North Vietnamese aggression ceases. Front lines, in north especially but also in south, are still fluid, with significant friendly pockets in enemy held territory and increasing defections from enemy military and civilian population. Formal division of country, under these circumstances, would therefore work principally to enemy advantage. Preservation of Laos as an integral state appears still to be in our interest.

(C) Third star to steer by, given (A) and (B), is Souvanna Phouma. He is Lao who most personifies 1962 Agreements, and with all his failings he is a true Centrist -Neutralist, patriotically motivated, internationally recognized. But at same time has condemned NVN aggression and has authorized unpublicized US military actions which have made war more costly to enemy in Vietnam and Laos. As long as Souvanna is at hold, we can also anticipate he will preserve trappings of tripartite government which visibly symbolize RLG fidelity to agreements of 1962. These trappings are essentially (1) retention of provisional government of National Union, symbolized especially by safeguarding of four NLHS portfolios, including that of Prince Souphanouvong as Deputy Prime Minister; and (2) maintenance of some identifiable Neutralist or Centrist presence in armed forces and political structure.

6. As long as Souvanna is in power he will probably be able to command external respect as a spokesman for a neutral Laos. Soviet attitudes are especially vital to his position, and he has taken renewed courage from hospitable attitude displayed by Soviet Ambassador Kirnassovsky since latter’s return in early November. Following conversation reported Vientiane 2971 (notal),UK Ambassador Warner had further long session with Kirnassovsky November 14. Latter fully accepted Warner’s statements concerning incidents affecting Generals Ma and Kong Le and seemed prepared to ride out new elections in expectation Souvanna is still fundamentally non-aligned and anxious retain Soviet support, however tacit. At large Lao reception November 15, Souvanna took Kirnassovsky aside for lengthy private but conspicuous conversation, following which Souvanna told Ambassador Warner with some elation that Kirnassovsky had given him same impression of Soviet flexibility. This Soviet attitude assumes some significance against background of Kong Le’s current problems.

7. There are new indications of restlessness on part of Peking most recently expressed in hard-hitting and authoritative mid-November articles and broadcasts condemning Laos for espousing a two-China policy, being too friendly to Taiwan, and supporting alleged US aggression. But we doubt that these noises will result, as Bangkok press has intimated, in withdrawal of recognition of RLG. ChiCom Ambassador locally has had number of diplomatic illnesses in recent weeks (Soviet November 7 celebration was one of them) but his counselor has attended receptions in normal manner. ChiCom stands at the Luang Fair Grounds, scheduled to open November 24, are still being erected. There are thus no local signs that ChiComs (or for that matter North Vietnamese or NLHS) contemplate a policy shift.

8. There remains, however, considerable dissatisfaction among Laos elite, particularly younger men, that they are still “saddled” both with Souvanna, whom they respect but for whom they feel no warmth, and with vestiges of “tripartitism” which to them symbolizes foreign intervention in Lao internal affairs and continuing restraint on their freedom of political action. Fortunately the wiser among the Lao elite accept this situation philosophically (Phoui and Ngon Sananikone, Tay Keolunagkhot, Sisouk na Champassak, Inpeng Suryadhay, Outhong Souvannavone, Sisounang Sisaleumsak, among others); and Souvanna continues to be supported and “tripartitism” tolerated by key military leaders, including Generals Ouan, Kouprasith, and Phasouk. King Sa-vang, despite his cultivated remoteness, is also exercising an increasingly constructive influence over government affairs, and in a crisis, such as finding a successor to Souvanna with none in sight, he would play a truly critical role. But forces working for change, especially discontent of young Lao with status quo grow increasingly strong and as last few months have proven can follow unpredictable courses.

9. In an international context, Vietnam is the key, and success or failure of our policies there will influence in large measure what happens in Laos. The other key element is Thailand. One can scarcely envision a happy or productive future for Laos without Thailand, and it should be our objective to cultivate and facilitate a further improvement in relations between them, particularly on such practical questions as transit of cargo.

10. In sum, it does not seem to us that our policies toward Laos need to take new directions, or bilateral programs now in being should be continued, especially our critical important USAID effort (now of a magnitude of $55 million) and we must seek to accelerate economic programs (UN, FEOF, NAM NGUM, etc.) should also be preserved and encouraged. Flexibility in our analysis and selection of political options is also essential, for Laos is, after all, an evolving society, and our own policies must be responsive to these changes.

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 2 LAOS. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong, London, Moscow, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, and DEPCHJUSMAG THAI.
2. Document 238.