Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

238. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, June 27, 1966, 0610Z.

1371. 1. Visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Unger June 24–26 provided excellent opportunity take pulse of Lao body politic in perspective of nineteen-month interval since he left Vientiane. During visit he held discussions with broadly representative cross-section of power elite, highlights of which follow. Big disappointment was weather, which closed in over Luang Prabang for three successive days and forced cancelation of audience with King Savang and luncheon with Crown Prince. Hastily substituted visit to USAID-assisted cluster villages at Banyeun in northern Vientiane plain was also almost washed out by untimely rains.

2. All Lao whom he consulted were unanimous in over-all assessment that there has been steady improvement on political, economic, and military fronts in past year and half. Principal factors cited were (A) ouster of Phoumi and Siho and of disruptive and corrupt influence in government which they represented; (B) return to constitutional forms with election of new National Assembly; (C) steady economic gains, highlighted by continuing success of stabilization program, multilateral undertaking to finance Nam Ngum hydro-electric project, and visible spread of government services (USAID-sponsored) to countryside; (D) growing effectiveness of air strikes and other military and psychological pressures against enemy forces; and (E) increasing Pathet Lao and dissident neutralist defections to friendly forces (from 140 in February to 400 in May). He found, in sum, atmosphere of restrained optimism about internal affairs and also about external situation with Allied military successes in South Vietnam sustaining conviction that North Vietnamese will eventually be brought to bay and RLG achieve some semblance of peace and prosperity.

3. Against this background of relative contentment and moderate progress, Lao nevertheless showed themselves preoccupied with usual set of internal problems.

A. There is strengthening conviction that present government, although composed of able men, is spread too thin, and there is general expectation that Souvanna on his return in late July from France will face concerted pressures to enlarge his cabinet, perhaps himself relinquishing one or more portfolios. Unresolved question is whether he can find truly qualified candidates outside of ranks of portfolio-hungry but not very able deputies such as Assembly President Oudom Souvannavong, said to relish portfolio of Minister of Health or of Foreign Affairs; Serc Volavongsa, who seeks Ministry of Public Works; and Khampha Sackda, candidate for now vacant position of Secretary of State for Finance. Souvanna is undoubtedly wise to keep this Pandora’s box closed for as long as he can.

B. Assembly deputies are already exercised that their two-year term expires next year. Min Justice Inpeng Suryadhay (himself a deputy) is at work on proposal that King extend term of present deputies from two to five years, which is normal span of service specific in constitution. Few give this proposal much chance of success against expected opposition of King Savang, who personally endorsed two-year term. Another proposal, advanced by Phoui Sananikone, is that King let this Assembly pass into oblivion and exercise his constitutional power to appoint entirely new Assembly. Phoui would vastly prefer this appointive process to either restricted or general elections in context of a divided Laos. Since Souvanna is apparently only mildly concerned at anxieties of deputies over their future, this problem is likely to lie fallow at least until late fall as far as he is concerned.

C. Souvanna is increasingly preoccupied, however, with problem of national unity against Neo Lao Hak Xat. He suggested to Phoui June 26 that Phoui accept mandate to establish “union of parties” in National Assembly, which we take to mean a national front incorporating all conservative factions and Neutralists. Union of this sort, while eminently desirable, would have to be based on a meeting of minds between Souvanna and Prince Boun Oum, and until that occurs, Phoui sees no useful role for himself in project. Mere fact, however, that Souvanna sees diminishing value in maintenance of separate Neutralist Party underlines evolution of his thought over past several years. If he could achieve political merger of Neutralists with conservatives into national front (while preserving status of neutrality for Laos), way would be eased to unification of Neutralist armed forces with FAR and to greater military as well as political efficiency. Unification of armed forces is also objective which General Kouprasith Abhay has very much in mind.

D. Perhaps because of generally favorable security situation and low level of enemy activity, military concerns did not loom large during talks. Kouprasith said that Lao/Viet may well seek establish fortress base on Bolivens Plateau if pressures continue to mount on their positions in corridor and in South Vietnam. He also anticipates increased enemy rice foraging activity in Panhandle during next dry season. On other hand, he believes friendly guerrilla, conventional, and air operations against enemy in northern Laos are likely to keep him off balance, and a relatively minor threat there, for some time.

4. Visit reaffirmed that Souvanna continues to be central authority on whom all important decisions devolve. He is being roundly criticized by many of his ministers, in particular Vice Premier Leuam Insisienmay, for his failure to consult them on major decisions such as fate of RLAF General Ma. Yet despite his short-comings he remains firmly entrenched in premiership and showed no signs of wanting out. Visits of several foreign personalities to Laos during past week (Unger, Lord Walston, Australian Minister Fraser, British Conservative MP Royle) as well as expected visit of Sainteny² have probably buoyed his spirits. Also, he can look forward to being in France from July 7 to 24 and subsequently to attending UN General Assembly in autumn. His visit to USSR has in no way altered his belief that maximum military pressures must be exerted against Hanoi, and while he would strongly resist entry of foreign friendly forces into Laos, he is equally strong advocate of intensified air strikes against NVN.

5. Unger will undoubtedly have much to add to this from his personal impressions. Our own conclusion is that visit was highly successful, providing occasion for Lao themselves to reflect on strides they have made since February 1965 rebellion and to look ahead to future with some confidence.

Swank

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL LAOS. Confidential. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, CINCPAC, Hong Kong, and Moscow. This telegram was retyped in the White House, but there is no indication whether or not it was sent to the President. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67)
2. Jean Sainteny, former Delegate General of France to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.