239. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Meeting with Ambassador Sullivan
Background: Ambassador William H. Sullivan who was in Washington on home leave and consultations, made a call on the Honorable John T. McNaughton, [Page 473] Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), at 1600 hours, 28 June 1966. In attendance were Rear Admiral F.J. Blouin, Director, Far East Region, OASD(ISA), Colonel J.H. Mobley, Staff Assistant for Laos, OASD(ISA), and Mr. Robert F. Slutz, Department of State Desk Officer for Laos.
Ambassador Sullivan reviewed the situation in Laos saying that improvements in the situation in Vietnam are assisting in keeping Laos quiet. He stated that the economic trend in Laos is favorable. Ambassador Sullivan believed that there were hopeful signs that with continued US economic aid, in accordance with the prescription in the President’s Johns Hopkins speech,2 Laos can eventually become economically independent and viable. To Ambassador Sullivan, this represented a changed attitude from that of a year ago when he was far less optimistic about the economic future of Laos.
The Ambassador informed Mr. McNaughton that he understood from previous discussions that a proposal had been made to transfer Laos military assistance from MAP to the Services. He said that he favored this proposal on condition that the sensitivity and classification of the Laos program be maintained in the presentation of Service budgets and in the implementation of the program by the Services.
Mr. McNaughton and the Ambassador opined that there will be some opposition in the Congress to the proposed transfer of Laos/Thailand programs from MAP, particularly Thailand. Senator Fulbright was mentioned as being potentially the chief opponent.
Ambassador Sullivan discussed the present organizational structure for military assistance in Laos whereby US military assistance in Laos is accomplished by the Requirements Office of USAID. He desired to preserve this organization, since it is considered necessary to abide by the Geneva Accords. A type organization in Thailand (currently DEPCHJUSMAG Thailand) was also believed by the Ambassador to be important to the continued support of the Laos program.
Mr. NcNaughton asked what the Lao attitude would be on a “barrier” across Laos to stop the infiltration into SVN. The Ambassador responded by saying that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma would not condone presence of US or other foreign troops and would quit thereby destroying the neutral posture of tri-partite structure of the Lao Government which has existed since the Geneva Accords of 1962. He thought that turmoil would ensue and the war in Laos would be intensified. He believed that the Soviets would withdraw their current support and tacit approval for the Royal Lao Government and would probably resume [Page 474] support and military assistance for Prince Souphanouvong, the Pathet Lao leader. The Ambassador pointed out that no materiel assistance from the Soviets is now being given to the Pathet Lao. This would, in his opinion, encourage increased support of the Pathet Lao from North Vietnam and eventually result in a full-scale invasion and over-running of all of Laos by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces, perhaps with the support of Communist China. In any event, a “barrier” would result in giving all Lao territory north of it to the PL which would arouse violent objection from the RLG.3
The Ambassador stated that he understood six divisions would be required to establish a “barrier.” While Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has said that he would not approve of the presence of US forces in Laos, he has concurred in US activities and operations in Laos. These are the type which are deniable and which do not arouse strenuous opposition from the Soviets and the Chinese Communists. The Ambassador feels that we are now walking a thin wire of tolerance of these activities and operations by the Soviets and Chinese Communists, Ambassador Sullivan remarked that he exercised close control over US personnel in Laos and could, if necessary, cause their removal in a very short period of time.
Rather than employ forces in Laos to form a “barrier,” the Ambassador reaffirmed his previously stated proposal for launching an operation against NVN from the sea in the vicinity of Vinh.
Ambassador Sullivan revealed his dissatisfaction of US tactical bombing in Laos which concentrates in the lower Panhandle rather than in the area of Laos near the Mu Gia Pass. He believed that an intensification of bombing in this area will be effective in destroying North Vietnamese personnel and materiel at their most vulnerable point, i.e., immediately after crossing the Mu Gia Pass into Laos. The Ambassador said he intended to make this point with the Secretary of Defense, as well as with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he meets with them on Friday, 1 July.4
The meeting concluded at 1625 at which time Ambassador Sullivan departed accompanied by Mr. McNaughton for an appointment with the Secretary of Defense.
- Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6649, Laos 000.1 (333 Laos), 1966. Top Secret. Drafted by Mobley on July 5 and cleared by Blouin. The meeting was held at the Pentagon.↩
- For text of the speech, April 7, 1965, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 848–852.↩
- McNaughton sent McNamara a June 30 memorandum describing this “chat” and noting that Sullivan “was very negative about a barrier across Laos.” McNaughton stated that Sullivan “said (1) that ‘Souvanna would quit the next day’ (presumably because a barrier implies the overt presence of US soldiers or their ‘lackeys’ in Laos) and (2) that the Russians would figure the wraps were off and we could expect vigorous Pathet Lao activity in Northern Laos supported by the Russians and perhaps even the Chinese.” Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Laos (Laos 385), 1966.↩
- No record of Sullivan’s discussion with McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been found.↩