236. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1306. 1. I called on Souvanna and King separately this morning to obtain their impressions of recent Royal visit to Soviet Union.2 Their impressions differ slightly and are reported below in general outline.
2. Souvanna said that, although there had been more sightseeing than serious exchanges of view, they nevertheless had been able to get some points across. He said that they were accompanied on entire trip by Zhukov, Secretary General of Foreign Office, and former Ambassador to China. He described him as well-informed and obviously sent along to talk substance.
3. He said their conversations had been quite specific, concerning detailed accusations by the Pathet Lao, etc., and they in turn had been specific with respect to North Vietnamese actions, etc. He said King had been quite forceful in presenting Laotian viewpoint.
4. However, despite these details, Souvanna had no impression of Soviet policy precision. He said he felt Soviets were engaged in study of their policy towards Lao and it was probably being reviewed with Soviet [Page 468] Ambassador Kirnassovsky, who remaining in Moscow until end of the month. He expected that when Kirnassovsky returned he would bring more precision with him.
5. King, on other hand, told me he considered Soviet policy was already quite precise. He said he had held long private talk with Podgorny without presence of Souvanna. He pointed out delicately that, since this was conversation between two chiefs of state, it was “privileged” and he could not give me details. However, he would like to make one observation.
6. He said he had read President Johnson’s Memorial Day speech and was struck by the fact that what President said coincided with what Podgorny said in two important particulars: (a) desire not to enlarge the war, and (b) desire to avoid damage to other U.S./USSR relations. He considered these perhaps the two most important points.
7. He then said that, if he were to draw the balance of his impressions of Soviet policy with respect to United States policy in Southeast Asia, he would advise the President to “just keep doing exactly what you are doing now,” and U.S. will obtain its objectives. He felt that Hanoi was becoming disillusioned with Peking and that the two major points of coincidence of U.S. and Soviet policy would fix the pattern of a settlement in Southeast Asia.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 LAOS. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Moscow, Saigon, and CINCPAC. The substance of this telegram was retyped in the White House and sent on June 10 to the President by Rostow who suggested, “This account of Souvanna and the King of Laos in Moscow will interest you—notably paras 6 and 7, which have the ring of credibility.” His initial on the source text indicates the President read the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XVI, Cables, 2/66–1/67)↩
- May 16–17.↩