Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

235. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)¹

Saigon, June 4, 1966, 0900Z.

MAC 4572. Ref: CINCPAC 030345Z Jun 66.² Subj: Arc Light.

1. In response to reference, let me stress at the outset that I support fully and enthusiastically the objective of obtaining optimum returns per Arc Light sortie. Attainment of this objective entails detailed consideration of two factors: the operational purpose to be served by a given strike or a series of strikes, and the availability of timely, reliable intelligence as the basis for target selection.

2. With regard to the operational purpose served by B–52 strikes in Laos, we see the effort as one designed to assist in destroying an integrated enemy logistic system associated with well-defined ground LOCs. In a very real sense our tactical and strategic air programs in the Laos Panhandle are directed against a vital portion of the enemy’s communication zone. Far more than harassment of infiltration activity is involved. Rather, we seek to identify and destroy storage depots, staging areas, maintenance facilities, [illegible] points, truck parks, bridge and ferry sites, control installations and road repair capabilities.

3. As regards availability of timely, reliable intelligence as a basis for targeting in Laos, we enjoy the benefit of a high order of FAC saturation of the area in question. Rich dividends have been produced as a result of increasing FAC familiarity with the enemy’s logistic system and his pattern of activity associated with operation of the system. The impressive Tiger Hound record in terms of trucks destroyed, secondary explosions and structures destroyed is illustrative of effective intelligence based largely on visual observation. Moreover, the fact that the enemy has been operating overtly throughout his LOC network in southern Laos has afforded us an intelligence advantage generally unknown in SVN. It is my considered judgment, in this regard, that our targeting in Laos has been supported more generously by effective intelligence than has the bulk of our targeting for SVN.

4. You have raised the question of how we might obtain more significant targets for Arc Light strikes and more judicious expenditure of ordnance. I know of but one solution to this problem; namely, periodic review in depth of targeting status and procedures. This is an undertaking in which I participate personally, the most recent instance having occurred within the past several weeks. Coupled with the review process must be command approval of each strike based on detailed assessment of all factors, including intelligence. As you know, I personally approve each Arc Light target as an outgrowth of this system. It is for this reason that I am in a position to assure you that our selection of these targets not only reflects maximum refinement of available information, but takes full advantage of all assessment techniques and targeting expertise available. Targets are competing for selection based on the merits and supportability of the target and not upon any preference for geographical division of effort.

5. Since 11 December last year, 240 B–52 strikes have been carried out under approved programs as follows:

Date	Laos	NVN	SVN
Dec 11–31	1		25
Jan 1–31	0		26
Feb 1–28	4		33
Mar 1–31	5		33
Apr 1–30	22	2	38
May 1–31	10		35
Jun 1–4	3		3
	45	2	193

It will be noted of the total strikes, only about 20 percent have been directed against targets in Laos. Commitment of resources against these targets has on no occasion been at the expense of more lucrative targets in SVN.

6. Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that our present approach to Arc Light targeting be continued. In light of experience gained to date, I am satisfied that it best supports the objective of obtaining optimum returns per sortie.

1. Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, Message Files, COMUSMACV, 1 April–30 June 1966. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. In CINCPAC telegram 030345Z, June 3, Sharp asked Westmoreland if some of the targets in the Laos Panhandle, such as truck parks or storage facilities, were appropriate targets for tactical aircraft rather than Arc Light bombing by B–52’s. Sharp was concerned about “obtaining more significant targets” and “a more judicious expenditure of ordnance.” (Ibid.)