219. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
752. 1. Harriman spent one hour and quarter in restricted conversation with Souvanna this morning and two and one half hours of more casual luncheon talk. Present at first meeting were Secretary General Lao FonOff, Cabinet Secretary, Fred Flott (from Saigon) as interpreter, and myself. Present at lunch were Minister Finance, three top generals of armed forces and members of U.S. mission. Lao luncheon guests were obviously chosen to demonstrate unity of armed forces with Souvanna-led government.
2. In restricted session, Harriman gave Souvanna general summary of visits which he and other Presidential emmissaries have made during current “peace offensive”2 and provided him with an indication of [Page 439] reactions which visits had elicited from various governments and personalities. He emphasized fact that, while President was sincere in his quest for peace, this was not an effort to “save face” or abandon our commitments to Vietnam. To underline these facts, he cited President’s remarks on Vietnam in today’s State of Union address.3
3. Souvanna thanked Harriman for his exposition. He agreed with need for continuing pressure on Hanoi for negotiations. He expressed view, however, that Chinese influence was still very strong in Hanoi and that Chinese would do all in their power to frustrate political settlement. He felt ChiComs must be faced squarely at this time and be stopped before they develop an effective nuclear force. He discussed subversive ChiCom activity in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia, as well as Laos.
4. Souvanna then went on to say that he had just had a surprise visit from Jerzy Michalowski, Secretary General of the Polish FonOff. Latter was in transit through Laos on his way to Hanoi (our subsequent checks with ICC manifests show that Michalowski had just come from Hanoi and was en route to Bangkok). He had made courtesy call and had discussed Vietnam and Laos.
5. Michalowski made two major points: (1) North Vietnamese considered U.S. “peace offensive” was really an ultimatum. U.S. was, in effect, saying that DRV must accept U.S. position or be subject to new and more severe punishment; (2) it would be “useful” for the United States to “accept the principle of DRV four points”,4 as a means of opening discussions. Their substance could be thrashed out later. (Although we attempted clarification of this rather vague formulation, Souvanna was unable provide any further precision.)
6. Souvanna said he told Michalowski that Poles had placed things backwards. If DRV wanted a détente, they should show their intentions by action now. They must withdraw their forces from Laos and they must cease violating Laotian territory by sending forces down Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam.
7. Michalowski had replied that Warsaw and Moscow both believed U.S. was preparing to launch an offensive against DRV by sending troops from Thailand across Laos. Souvanna had replied that, if DRV continued give U.S. pretext by maintaining forces in Laos, there was [Page 440] grave danger this would happen. He therefore considered it all the more reason DRV should withdraw its troops, in order eliminate this pretext.
8. Harriman expressed interest in Michalowski visit and in his conversation with Souvanna. He recalled that Rapacki had agreed make contact with Hanoi and had said that it might require “unusual means to reach them.” Perhaps Michalowski was the messenger. Harriman then discussed at some length U.S. position re “four points” and our willingness talk about them with DRV; but said we could not accept “the principle” of the four points if that meant, for example, agreeing to the idea that the Liberation Front was the dominant authority in South Vietnam. He asked Souvanna if latter thought Liberation Front had any popular base.
9. Souvanna said that Liberation Front held its grip on people by “authority of fear”. He said they had demonstrated they were not afraid of killing people to enforce their control. The same occurs in Laos, but the falsity of Communist claims is demonstrated by steady flow of refugees out of Pathet Lao-held territory.
10. Harriman asked whether Souvanna had any points he would like former carry back to Washington. Souvanna said there was one matter he had raised with me which was continuing to give him great trouble. This was crescendo of newspaper speculation about U.S. intentions send troops into Laos. Although he personally had accepted my interpretation and explanation Secretary McNamara’s remarks in Saigon (when Secretary spoke of action against infiltration), there was great deal of public speculation that we were preparing invade Laos. He pointed to Michalowski’s statement to indicate type of trouble this caused. Many people even assumed that presence U.S. troops in Laos was a given fact.
11. Souvanna then cited recent newspaper story (St. Louis Post-Dispatch) that there were Thai forces marching into Laos. He complained that U.S. Spokesman (Department of State), instead of issuing vigorous denial, had made “very weak” reply. This only augmented the speculation.
12. Souvanna asked whether Washington could make a flat and unequivocal statement which would scotch all these rumors. He also asked if he could quote Harriman as denying the story about Laos troops and the Polish allegation about sending U.S. troops across Laos to attack DRV. Harriman pointed out problems inherent in our undertaking speak for Thai but agreed we could work out something about denying plan to attack DRV across Laos. (We subsequently worked out some phraseology which supports independence and neutrality of Laos and denies intent send U.S. troops across Laos to attack North Vietnam. It will be issued on sole responsibility of RLG stating that these assurances emerged from conversation. We will send exact text when issued—pre-sumably tomorrow.)
[Page 441]13. Conversation then turned to other matters, of which more important will be reported septels outside Pinta series.
14. Harriman returned Bangkok 1615 local. Memcon follows by pouch.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Immediate; Exdis/Pinta. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Moscow, and Warsaw. Passed to the White House.↩
- Harriman was in Vientiane on January 12 for talks with Souvanna on ending the Vietnam war. He was one of the U.S. envoys in the “Peace Offensive” initiated by President Johnson in conjunction with the suspension of the bombing of North Vietnam. Harriman visited Warsaw on December 29, 1965, for discussions with Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki; Yugoslavia on January 1, 1966, for discussions with President Tito; New Delhi on January 2 for a meeting with Prime Minister Shastri; Iran and Pakistan on January 3 for meetings with President Ayub Khan and the Shah; Egypt on January 4 for a discussion with President Nasser; Tokyo from January 6–9 for talks with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Shiina; and Canberra January 9–12 for discussions with Australian officials.↩
- For text of the speech, January 12, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, Book I, pp. 3–12.↩
- On April 8, 1965, DRV Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong told the National Assembly that it was the policy of the DRV to respect the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam based on four points: (1) recognition of the rights of the people of Vietnam and the withdrawal of the U.S. military from South Vietnam; (2) no military alliance, bases, troops, or personnel in North and South Vietnam; (3) settlement of the internal affairs of South Vietnam without foreign interference and in accordance with the program of the NFLSV; and (4) peaceful reunification of Vietnam without foreign interference.↩
- Airgram A–198 from Vientiane, January 19. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN) In telegram 1382 from Bangkok, January 14, Harriman commented on Sullivan’s report of his talk with Souvanna. Harriman reported that Souvanna made it clear to him that his policy was to maintain the support of the Soviets and that he feared China and North Vietnam. Harriman also reported that Souvanna “doesn’t mind our bombing of panhandle where there is no Lao population as long as the we don’t admit it.” Souvanna did not approve of large detachments of troops entering Laos. (Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Souvanna Phouma)↩