Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

218. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, January 6, 1966.

721. 1. Shining Brass operations in authorized areas of Laos Panhandle along SVN border have been targeted against “hard” objectives, which consist largely of DRV storage depots, logistics points, and troop concentration areas. With development of Tiger Hound, these objectives are coming more and more under U.S. air attacks. MACV has therefore considered that Shining Brass ought to be withdrawn from operations against these objectives, and moved instead against relatively “soft” targets.

2. These “soft” targets have been defined to me as way stations; porterage areas, etc., which are less likely to be heavily defended strong points. Rather than having Shining Brass ferret these out for air strikes, MACV would propose that these be made subject of harassment attacks by “exploitation forces”, which would be larger in size and more extensive in operations than current 9 to 18 man intelligence probes.

3. Moreover, teams would be given task of operating in far more extensive area than currently permitted. This area would, in MACV’s proposal, coincide with controlled strike zone now utilized for Tiger Hound air strikes. They would be introduced and extricated by helicopter. They would be made up largely of Nung tribesmen encadred by U.S. special forces.

4. In short, MACV suggestion would shift Shining Brass from its original scouting and intelligence mission against targets susceptible to air strike and would fashion it into harassment mission against more fleeting or less tangible objectives. This proposal has been put forward by MACV through military channels for planning purposes and has been put to me informally to obtain political judgment.²

5. Department will appreciate, as consequence Souvanna’s recent statements to me that he could not take the international heat which would accompany entry U.S. ground forces into Laos, that I could not raise this proposition with him. He has, in effect, told me in advance that the answer would be no. Therefore, chances of getting this approved by him are in my opinion absolutely zero.

6. If need for operation is felt so compelling that it should be undertaken without Souvanna’s consent (and in the light of his known objections) it would have to be done without consultation and we would have to take the risks of those consequences which would flow from possibilities of it becoming public knowledge either through enemy capturing some of our American forces (there would be probably 30 or 40 Americans with each 540 man exploitation force) or through indiscretions by friendly elements.

7. Viewed purely from subjective perspective, one immediate consequence would be loss of my own credibility vis-à-vis Souvanna. I have taken great care since I have been here to check out all our actions with him and have never authorized anything which he has specifically disapproved. I don’t know what the consequences would entail if we ignored him in this matter but would predict that it would make it more difficult for me to obtain his concurrence in other programs of perhaps greater significance than this one.

8. Ultimate judgment on these matters had perhaps better be made by persons who will be more objective than those of us either in Vientiane or Saigon. Balance of advantages and disadvantages can probably best be seen from Washington. Would therefore appreciate Washington guidance.³

Sullivan

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, CINCPAC, and COMUSMACV. No transmittal time appears on the source text, which was received at the Department of State at 6:37 a.m., January 6.
2. The proposal was formally submitted by Westmoreland in telegram COMUSMACV, 707 DTG 080105Z, January 8. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 465 to Vientiane, January 13, the Department agreed with Sullivan’s analysis and did not believe he had overstated the negative factors. The Department noted that MACV proposed a gradual expansion of Shining Brass teams and stated that it preferred to take a position on the matter after hearing the views of JCS and DOD. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS)