Office of the Historian

153. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1

Washington, December 19, 1964.

SUBJECT

  • Recapitulation of Meeting on Laos and South Vietnam on December 192

A two-week program of Barrel Roll activities was submitted. The program continues in fairly low key and signals (“by design”) no intensification of U.S. actions in Laos.3

It was agreed to continue our stone-walling tactics with respect to information on these flights. We will deal with shoot-downs on a case-by-case basis. (Greenfield noted that there is a great lack of interest, both in this country and abroad, on U.S. planes over Laos). However, we should prepare for leaks to the likes of Alsop or Baldwin.

The infiltration report was shelved indefinitely,4 but the information concerning increased infiltration should seep out gradually. If Embassy spokesmen were put under considerable pressure they could give a background briefing on the subject.

Vance gave a rapid run-down on scheduled plans for 34–A operations.5 Particular emphasis was put on the difficulties for Maritime Ops experienced at this time of year. Despite a request from Saigon, it was decided that this program had a large enough bank of targets to give it the flexibility necessary.

Forrestal gave a run-down on progress in connection with Third Country aid.6 Except for a reference to the Australian response (not too discouraging) to the President’s letter, he added little to what you already knew about progress on this program.

Bill Bundy raised the question of contingency planning for the use of ground forces in Vietnam. The key point here is to get the Australians committed to participation, if necessary. Bundy’s probing of the Australian Ambassador brought a surprisingly favorable response. On the [Page 312] other hand, his talk with the New Zealand Ambassador was somewhat discouraging.

General Johnson, who had just returned from Vietnam, mentioned the concern that some of the younger military officers have about the lack of understanding in the U.S. concerning Vietnam.

The following actions are to be taken:

1.
You are to get final approval on the two-week program for Barrel Roll and OP Plan 34–A.
2.
I am to work up a draft Christmas message from the President to Americans in Vietnam (I am in contact with Rowan on this).

There will be no meeting next Saturday.7

Chester L. Cooper 8
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Secret.↩
  2. The meeting was held at the Department of State at 10 a.m. and was attended by William and McGeorge Bundy, Ball, Forrestal, Vance, McNaughton, Cooper, Rowan, McCone, and others. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 1012, footnote 2.↩
  3. See Document 151.↩
  4. Regarding this report, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, p. 1013, footnote 4.↩
  5. Against North Vietnam.↩
  6. To South Vietnam.↩
  7. December 26.↩
  8. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩