Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

140. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM–870–64

Washington, October 13, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Operations in Laos (U)

1. On 30 September 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided you with their views for implementation of air and ground cross-border operations in the Laos corridor. With regard to the air operations phase, they forwarded an air strike plan for attacks on Viet Cong (VC) infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle. They recommended that the targets associated therewith be struck by a mix of Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) T–28s and US aircraft under a Yankee Team cover. US participation was recommended as follows:

a. US air strike hard targets—bridges—and such additional hard targets not suitable for the RLAF as may be developed.

b. US air fly flak-suppression missions for the RLAF and high cover in the event that Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) aircraft attempt to interfere.

2. From a review of Ambassador Unger’s message of 6 October 1964 (Vientiane to State No. 581) as amplified by the Air Attaché, Vientiane’s message of 12 October 1964 (AIRA Vientiane CX–822),² the Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted that the RLAF has:

a. Proposed certain modifications to the target list. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the modifications, including the striking of two targets in Laos west of Mu Gia Pass which the Lao have developed from RLAF intelligence sources.

b. Requested US air cover for strikes against four of the targets, those close to the North Vietnam/Lao border. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider this a proper extension of their recommendation for high cover in the event of interference by DRV aircraft.

c. Proposed that Yankee Team jets strike four heavily-defended, high-risk targets. One of these four (Nape bridge) was originally scheduled for a US strike; the other three are among the more important targets. It is noted that Ambassador Unger suggests that US air suppress the AAA defenses at these targets for T–28 strikes, a proposal in line with the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Indicated that they will commence striking 13 targets in Laos on 14 October 1964 during an eight-day period, weather permitting. The targets, as indicated in subparagraph 2 a, above, include two that are close to Mu Gia Pass in Laos; the remainder do not include the hard targets for which US strike assistance has been requested (Nape bridge, Tchepone, and Ban Thay). They do include those for which air cover has been requested.

3. Only a small portion of the air strike program has to date been approved; namely, strikes by the RLAF on those targets, excluding Mu Gia Pass, which they are willing to hit without US air cover or fire support. With regard to Mu Gia, Ambassador Unger has indicated that the Lao give Mu Gia Station in Laos a top priority as a critical supply point; he recommends that the RLAF strike it with US jet cover operating well within Lao territory. The Defense Intelligence Agency considers that the militarily significant target at Mu Gia Pass is in North Vietnam and has detected no military activity at Mu Gia Station. As noted in paragraph 2, above, the RLAF has developed two targets in this area in Laos.

4. In connection with these operations in Laos, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently noted the report of the initial discussions in Saigon of the newly formed SEASIA coordinating group, which expressed unanimous agreement that US participation in the air operations in the corridor is essential if such operations are to have the desired military and psychological impact, particularly since the initiative for the operations came from the United States. Specifically, the group has proposed that the United States reconsider:

a. Removing the ban on RLAF strikes on Mu Gia,

b. Authorizing participation by US air in strikes against the hard targets (which together with Mu Gia are among the most important), and

c. Permitting the United States to fly air cover for RLAF strikes, as requested by the RLAF.

5. Failure to provide US assistance as requested could result in losses to the RLAF, both in manpower and aircraft, that would be unacceptable to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG). Without assistance in a time of need, the RLG could conceivably question US resolve in Laos as well as in Southeast Asia. Similarly, the Government of Thailand could view US reluctance to support Laos as a demonstration of US weakness. US participation in the air operations in Laos is essential to the success of the operation, politically and militarily. Recognition must be given to the fact that the PL and the DRV will be sensitive to attacks in the Panhandle and to US participation. Our participation will represent a penetration into a PL area which has been undisputed PL territory for the last few years. In addition, air operations in the Laos corridor should be undertaken because of their importance to the over-all effort in South Vietnam. The situation there, as indicated in SNIE 53–2–64,³ has continued to deteriorate. Stronger, more dynamic, and successful actions by the United States outside of the Republic of Vietnam, which clearly demonstrate our resolve and commitment to support military operations against the common enemy, could well serve as a principal means of arresting this trend.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, accordingly, again recommend US participation in the air strike program in the corridor to include:

a. High cover for RLAF strikes as requested by the RLAF. (Initially four targets.)

b. US air strikes on targets beyond the RLAF capability to handle. (Initially Nape bridge.)

c. US flak suppression for RLAF strikes as required. (Initially Tchepone barracks, Tchepone military area, Ban Thay military area.)

d. SAR and air defense operations as may be required.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff further recommend that no attempt be made to persuade the Lao not to strike PL/VM targets in Laos even though close to the North Vietnam border.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Earle G. Wheeler ⁴
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 68 A 4023, Laos 000.1–370.64 (092 Laos). Top Secret.
2. Telegram 581 from Vientiane, October 6, is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S.AIRA Vientiane CX–822 has not been found.
3. SNIE 53–2–64, “The Situation in South Vietnam,” October 1, 1964, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. I, pp. 806–811.
4. Printed from a copy that indicates Wheeler signed the original.