Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

7. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Australia¹

Washington, June 29, 1965, 8:30 p.m.

1111. (Following based on uncleared memo, FYI, Noforn and subject to revision pending review.)

ANZUS Council Meeting.

ANZUS Council met Washington June 28 with Holyoake, Hasluck, and Secretary Rusk heading delegations. Discussions concentrated on Viet-Nam. Discussion Indonesia-Malaysia brief and consisted mainly summary current situation. Principal points of interest as follows:

[Here follows Hasluckʼs account of the recent Commonwealth Conference.]

2) Holyoake Position on Pause in Bombing in Viet-Nam—Holyoake suggested that, if U.S. saw any positive advantages to be gained from another pause in bombing North Viet-Nam, we might consider timing to coincide with visit Commonwealth PM mission to those capitals prepared receive it. He noted official rejection mission only received so far from Peking. Also said he prepared postpone sending New Zealand artillery battery to SVN if Prime Ministers mission has prospect of success. Noted this was his own idea but he had been approached by Nkrumah in London, who made similar suggestion. Australians also asked by Nkrumah to withdraw present forces in Viet-Nam pending outcome mission. Response was negative.

3) Negotiations with Liberation Front in Viet-Nam—Hasluck emphasized problem to be anticipated from growing pressures from Australian public opinion for negotiations with VC. Secretary stated VC only one of many factions in SVN and had no more right participate in peace talks than others, which represent far larger segments population. In addition, we cannot concede to armed minority right to shoot way to conference table and participate in negotiations over future government. He suggested our three governments and others increase efforts world capitals counter this sentiment.

4) Communist Attitudes on Viet-Nam—Secretary said that Sovs now appear anxious not to discuss Viet-Nam with us. During recent pause in bombing in North Viet-Nam, Secretary had discussions with Gromyko, who appeared very harsh and uncooperative. Contacts with Chicoms in Warsaw always begin with demand U.S. withdraw from Taiwan and, when we refuse to discuss this matter, conversation becomes stereotyped and unproductive. Informal contacts with Hanoi so far unproductive. Hanoi has also rebuffed UN efforts arrange negotiations.

5) Indonesia-Malaysia—On Malaysia Australian Air Chief Marshal Scherger reviewed military situation, pointed out that since August 1964 over 1000 Indonesian infiltrators into Malaysia killed or captured and that, at present level, Malaysia, with Commonwealth support, well able handle Indonesian military “confrontation”. Hasluck stated view Sukarnoʼs position within Indonesia less and less comfortable and now some question whether he enough in control of situation to call off “confrontation” even if he wished do so. Secretary noted we concerned about growth of PKI and that not clear what combination of counter forces available to prevent Communists from acceding to power under present circumstances.

6) Nuclear Proliferation—Secretary said we had hoped matter nuclear weapons could be brought under international control, under Baruch proposals at end of World War II. Problem of nuclear proliferation is not that present nuclear powers want to spread nuclear weapons but that other states will move to obtain nuclear weapons to ensure own security. Unless something reasonable worked out in NATO to provide Germans with participation in nuclear weapons, future German Government, for example, may move to obtain nuclear weapons on its own. India presents real problem, as would be difficult for U.S. to provide broad nuclear guarantee to India as long as India insists on remaining non-aligned.

Full summary of meeting to follow.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 66 D 347, CF 2529. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Robert J. Morris (SPA/E) and Conlon and cleared by Cuthell and William Bundy. Also sent to Wellington and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Conlon and Morris also prepared extensive notes of the ANZUS meeting. (Ibid., Central Files, DEF 4 ANZUS)