Office of the Historian

6. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, June 28, 1965, 12–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECTS

  • 1. New Zealand Forces in Vietnam
  • 2. Public Opinion in New Zealand re US Policy

PARTICIPANTS

  • The President
  • Mr. William P. Bundy
  • Ambassador Hand
  • Prime Minister Holyoake of New Zealand
  • Ambassador Laking of New Zealand

The President asked about the status of New Zealand forces for South Vietnam, and expressed gratification at the New Zealand decision to send a combat artillery battery. The Prime Minister noted that preparations to send the battery were far advanced. He went on to say that New Zealand had 1700 men in Malaysia (sic)—(the actual total of military men there is about 1100 according to the Ambassador)—and indicated this was a sizeable contribution in relation to the population, 1/80th as big as the US.

The President asked whether it would be wise to invoke the SEATO Treaty. Mr. Bundy commented that the custom of unanimity in SEATO had precluded SEATO action as such, but that the active SEATO members in Vietnam considered themselves to be fulfilling their SEATO obligations, which they accepted as operating on an individual basis. Prime Minister Holyoake agreed with this point. Mr. Bundy further noted that any question of SEATO action as such might encounter not only French and Pakistani opposition, but reservations by the British, inasmuch as the British troop commitment to Malaysia precluded, in their view, any combat troops to Vietnam.

The Prime Minister commented that the New Zealand decision to send the battery had been taken in the face of negative votes by the Parliamentary Opposition, and commented that the division in the House (approximately 45–35) roughly reflected the division of sentiment within New Zealand. The President asked what the popular reaction would be in New Zealand if the US said it could do nothing further unless it was on some collective basis. The Prime Minister responded that the man in the street had only a very dim idea of what Vietnam stood for, but implied that the government would take a different view.

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The President commented that division of sentiment in the US was probably roughly 65–35 in favor of Administration policy at the present time, but said that it might become more adverse, to perhaps 55–45. The Prime Minister said that New Zealand opinion seemed to be moving in a more favorable direction, although the overwhelming bulk of the New Zealand people were emotionally opposed to any war, and it took a good deal to replace this emotion by the logic of the situation. He said that leading newspapers were now generally behind the government, although they had some trouble with universities and the clergy. He said that there should be no doubt that the government itself was 100% in accord with US policy.

The Prime Minister referred again to the New Zealand battery, and said that it was of very high quality and, he added with some pride, had better equipment and training than the Australians.

The President asked about the Commonwealth Prime Ministersʼ Mission, and the Prime Minister said that there was still doubt whether Hanoi would receive it but that if it did not, he supposed there would be no use in proceeding. The President agreed with this position. The Prime Minister said that at least the Mission would show who was “banging doors.” The President responded that it should have this effect on the world, but that the world did not seem to heed the true facts—there was no criticism of aggression and cruelty by others, such as the recent restaurant bombing, whereas we were criticized for everything we did.

The conversation ended on a warm note of feeling.

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, New Zealand, Memos, 11/63–11/68. Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. The meeting was held at the White House.↩