155. Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and the Presidentʼs Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1
[Here follows a brief discussion unrelated to Cambodia.]
McGB: Iʼm calling on another matter. Have you got a minute? One of our aircraft has dropped bombs on a Cambodian village. I donʼt know whether youʼve seen the reporting on that? Itʼs been in some of the papers. Well it did do it, 2 or 3 days ago, April 28—2 days—and we now have a full report from Saigon saying that it did. The operational question is whether we admit it to the Cambodians who are now accusing us of it, and the Department is, on the whole, inclined to think there is no real alternative, that the United States Government canʼt very well, that it will come out, and we canʼt get anyone else to take the responsibility; it is very irritating. And we would have to, if we do the normal thing in an international situation, [Bundy is apparently reading from an unidentified telegram:] “we would regret the loss of life, injuries to individuals and damage to property. And extend deepest sympathy to the families affected by losses, and express our preparation to discuss appropriate compensation.” Obviously we are also obviously annoyed because they [Page 348] broke windows in our Embassy on account of Newsweek, but that is not the same thing as loss of life. This is a flat violation of standing target rules. They gave a target that was nearer the border than we normally allow, and then the fellow bombed the wrong village and it was in the wrong country. Apparently the damage according to our Army Attaché in Phnom Penh is one young man killed and four civilians wounded. [Bundy apparently reading and paraphrasing an unidentified telegram:] “And there is a pilot error, an air operations acceptance of the target which violated specific instructions which Westmoreland had promulgated at my direction in the wake of a border operation last October. This violation” etc., describes the violation, “incident resulted from a most regrettable combination, failure of the US officer to follow clear and explicit MACV orders, and secondly pilot error in identifying the target. It has occurred to us that since Cambodia initially and mistakenly identified the aircraft as GVN, we could perhaps ask the GVN to accept responsibility for the incident. However, since it is so widely know that the VN Air Force was not operating in the area, and since General Ky or some of his officers would object to be publicly charged with incidents for which they were not responsible,” he doesnʼt see how we could do that.
Dean Rusk feels it would be terrible to try to off load the responsibility on any other country. We could, of course, pretend it never happened, but there is a real question as to whether, and this is really what Max [Taylor] would prefer to do. [Bundy is apparently reading or paraphrasing an unidentified telegram:] “We see two other possibilities: promptly accept responsibility and offer compensation; second we might say nothing publicly and have the GVN comment that no GVN Air Force aircraft were in the area. The question is whether we can hold this position in Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Washington. General Westmoreland has appointed a board of officers to fix responsibility of individuals directly and indirectly concerned. The board will complete its investigation and submit its recommendations to Westmoreland within the next 48 hours.”
Now you might prefer to wait thereto until that board has reported. But it will report, I suspect, what Max warns us of. The immediate question is whether you are clear enough in your mind to authorize us to seek an appointment in Phnom Penh, or do you prefer to wait?
LBJ: Iʼll wait until the board comes in.
McGB: If I were in your position, that is what I would do. Right, sir.
[Here follows discussion of the Dominican Republic.]
- Source: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts of Telephone Conversations and Meetings, Tape F 65.1, Side A, PNO 1. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the Office of the Historian specifically for this volume.↩