Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

154. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, April 21, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Handling of Cambodian Conference Proposal

I had roughly a half-hour with Ambassador Taylor on this subject in Honolulu. He read carefully your Nodis message of Monday² and we in effect went on from there. During the earlier discussions on other issues, he had indicated that his initial reaction had been that he did not see the point of getting into a conference in any way, shape, or form, but I think his view was substantially altered by the reading of the cable and by our discussion.

The only point I made to him that is not in the cable is that a Cambodian conference could be a very long drawn-out process and give us a continuing safety valve against the interventions of U Thant, Pearson, Shastri, etc. We would be able at all times to point to the existence of the conference and the proximity of US and DRV representatives, to argue that we were leaving no stone unturned in channels of communication.

I have also seen the cable from Saigon³ suggesting that Gordon Walker see Quat before we attempt to sit down with him and go over the whole range of issues involved. Ambassador Taylor confirmed that he and Alex have been trying for some time to have a quiet talk with Quat on the general subject of the political track, and that Quat has been putting this off. No doubt the Gordon Walker visit will be a strong factor in getting Quat to talk on the whole set of issues, including the question of taking a position now on eventual free elections.

We left it that the best course of action would probably be to tell the British that Gordon Walkerʼs instructions for Bangkok should stand the same for his conversations in Saigon. However, we should be prepared to follow up and to indicate to Quat the following US position with respect to a Cambodian conference:

a. The US is not enthusiastic about such a conference in itself, but cannot well be negative when the Communist side has agreed and we have taken the position of favoring “unconditional discussions” on Vietnam.

b. In terms of world and US criticism making the continuation of pressures against the North more difficult over time, the existence of a Cambodian conference forum would have great defensive value as a safety valve.

c. In any discussions on Cambodia either in the conference or connected with it, the US would take the following positions:

1. We would insist that SVN interests be safeguarded and that any agreement be subject to agreement on the borders reached directly between the RKG and GVN.

2. We would oppose any “guarantee”, since our own Constitutional problems alone make this impossible.

3. We would oppose any expansion of the ICC role to police whatever assurances are included in a general agreement.

4. We would cooperate fully in defending border violations by GVN forces as being due entirely to the VC, as we had done last spring in the UN.

5. We would do everything possible to exclude and brand as irrelevant any Cambodian accusations against SVN based on Khmer Serei or any other allegations

d. In keeping with our position on “unconditional discussions” we would be available to all parties on this subject outside the conference forum, as indeed we are now through diplomatic channels. However, we would stick rigidly to the position that “unconditional” meant no conditions on either side. If the question were to come up what we would accept in return for cessation of bombing of the DRV, we would be in close touch with Quat before making any response in any case, and our present tentative thinking is along the lines of the tough position stated in the Nodis cable.

If this line of action commends itself to you, I think we should draft a cable along these lines to Saigon today to confirm.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CAMB. Secret;Exdis.
2. Apparent reference to telegram 2363 to Saigon, April 18, in which Rusk asked Taylor to raise with Quat the question of a Cambodian conference as a possible means of initiating a settlement between North and South Vietnam. (Ibid., POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S)
3. Telegram 3459 from Saigon, April 20. (Ibid.)
4. Circular telegram 2025, April 22, (sent to Saigon as well as 10 other posts). (Ibid., POL 8 CAMB)