Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

138. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Trueheart)¹

Washington, June 30, 1964.

The attached is a proposed message to convey to Sihanouk through an intermediary² [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. I think it is good as far as it goes. The only question in my mind is whether—if the intermediary is sufficiently sophisticated—we should say anything about the Khmer Serei or any other specific problem that has haunted our relationship. Whether or not we put it in the letter, I wonder where we do stand about the KS. Certainly Kidder should have a good line to take on this subject before he walks into the lionʼs mouth.

Please give me a quick answer on the letter and let me know at more leisure about the KS problem generally.

W.P.B. ³

Attachment

Washington, June 30, 1964.

Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Neubert) to the Director (Trueheart)

The attached memo from Mr. Bundy covered a draft letter from the Secretary to John McCone dictated by the Secretary himself. This had to be returned promptly to the Secretaryʼs office so we do not have a copy. The letter suggested that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] go back to Sihanouk with a broad general view of Washington thinking on the subject of Cambodia which the Secretary then outlined. He noted our desire for good relations with Cambodia and restated our respect for Cambodian independence and neutrality. He also mentioned our hope that Cambodian relations with Thailand and South Viet-Nam could be improved and professed to be unable to understand why Cambodia felt communism was the wave of the future in SEA in view of our stated determination to help the countries of the area defend themselves from communist aggression. He made the point that once North Viet-Nam left its neighbors alone, US forces would leave the area. He expressed the hope that the UN mission now in the area would be able to obtain constructive suggestions from Cambodia and SVN on how to resolve the problem of Viet Cong violation of Cambodian territorial integrity. In closing, he noted the confusion which had been caused in the past by diplomacy through public speeches and press releases and hoped that we would be able to work out some way of having frank discussions on a personal face-to-face basis. We would welcome any suggestion the Prince had for achieving this. (I assume this may have been designed to enhance the possibility of Kidder gaining useful contact with the Prince.)

I told Bundy that I agreed with him that the message was well designed to make the broad general points which Sihanouk must understand before the specific problems at issue between us can be attacked. If the Prince were to accept the broad outlines of our policy, there should be no difficulty with the minor details. Therefore, I thought the message should avoid the contentious questions such as Khmer Serei, US aid termination, etc.

At some point we should get a come-back copy of the letter as sent to McCone.⁴

JWN

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL CAMB–US. Secret.
2. The draft message was not attached.
3. Printed from a copy that indicates Bundy initiated the original.
4. The following note by Trueheart is on the source text: “JWN[eubert] 1. Fully agree. 2. Letʼs get definitive rundown on Khmer Serei status. 3. All this should be brought to Kidderʼs attention. WT”