Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

137. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, June 12, 1964, 9:28 p.m.

3278. USUNʼs 4401.² Dept appreciates excellent analysis contained reftel and concurs therein with following additional comments:

1. Re first objective of insuring SC Missionʼs report opens door to more permanent UN involvement along Cambodian-Vietnamese frontier, we must be careful to see that any such further UN engagement is of kind to serve our interests and does not on contrary result in GVNʼs getting short end of stick. We continue favor establishment substantial and effective UN presence which could measurably reduce, if not eliminate, Viet Cong operations across border. Given history of debate in Council, however, present commission unlikely recommend UN force of size to do proper job. In these circumstances, while we wish work for helpful UN involvement, we must avoid recommendations for type of UN presence which would find easy target in GVN border violations but in effect whitewash Viet Cong activities because of inability detect them.

2. On border demarcation, we believe UN involvement should be left to GVN discretion in view potentialities this problem for further exacerbation GVN-RKG relations. We are opposed in any case to injection US in matter of determining basis of frontier delineation and therefore do not wish influence Vietnamese to accept border as in USUN 4273.³ Apart from technical difficulties involved in use of Service Geographique maps, suggested formulation is Cambodian position pure and simple.

3. We agree GVN must demonstrate Vietnamese forces under strict orders not enter Cambodian territory and we trust Embassy Saigon will attempt insure no slip-up in ARVN statements to Mission this regard. For duration mission it will be doubly important every effort be made by both ARVN and US personnel to avoid crossing Cambodian border.

4. To demonstrate Viet Cong use Cambodian territory, we believe GVN should inundate SC Mission with prisoner interrogation reports and white papers (including any material scheduled for publication July 20 anniversary), arrange for “best” POWʼs talk to Mission, and provide information on chemicals imported via Cambodia for munitions manufacture. Re aerial photos or other documentation, evidence must be irrefutable. If Saigon or GVN believes photos its possession reveal presence Viet Cong installations in Cambodia, request they be sent soonest to National Photo Interpretation Center for evaluation as to whether evidence good enough to give to SC Mission. We concur emphasis should be placed on Viet Cong activity and RKG convenience played down.

5. It is essential that commission not recommend reconvocation Geneva Conference as solution to border problems. Again given history of debate and composition of Mission, we consider it unlikely such recommendation will be made; at same time, RKG can be counted upon continue put its position forward, and constant vigilance on our part will consequently be required. It may prove necessary settle for less forthright statement on some points favoring GVN in Missionʼs report in return for absence mention Geneva Conference.

Request action addressees work toward bringing about report in sense of USUNʼs 4401 as modified by foregoing; Embassy Saigon in particular should assist GVN in every possible way to present reasonable and convincing case.

Also request any ideas action addressees may wish advance in connection SC Mission, and specifically comments on relative merits and feasibility following measures within range of those Mission might suggest:

A. Resumption GVN-RKG talks with view finding ways to ease or resolve border situation.

B. Establishment permanent GVN-RKG border commission to keep border situation under constant review, jointly investigate border incidents, and develop measures designed to reduce and if possible eliminate such incidents.

C. Establishment UN presence in form senior representative of SYG supported by small staff whose function would be look into alleged incidents and report to SYG. Such UN rep would need freedom of access to GVN and RKG territory and mandate broad enough enable him make thorough investigation and recommendations to SYG.

D. A and/or B above supplemented by presence of UN rep either as observer or as active third party.

E. Technical mission organized by SYG to supervise marking of those parts of border where incidents occur and where border markings nonexistent or obscure.

F. SYG maintenance of “watching brief” on GVN-RKG border situation, receipt of information on developments from both governments, and consultation with parties as he deems appropriate in continuing effort resolve problem.

G. Establishment Gussing-type mission⁴ with mandate not limited to border (but left vague in order not conflict with terms SC resolution) to serve as general point of contact between two governments in order assist them in solving various problems in their relations.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S/UN. Confidential. Drafted by William G. Jones and Patricia M. Byrne of UNP; cleared by Buffum, Trueheart, Mendenhall, Salans, and Stephen M. Schwebel of L/UNA; and approved by Cleveland. Also sent to Saigon and Phnom Penh and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, London, Paris, Abijan, Rabat, Rio de Janeiro, Oslo, Taipei, and La Paz.
2. In telegram 4401 from USUN, June 8, the Mission suggested that the Security Councilʼs decision to send a three-man mission to Cambodia and Vietnam to report on border friction, while only a small step, was an opportunity to involve the UN more actively in South Vietnamese-Cambodian border issues. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 4273, May 27, the Mission reported that South Vietnamʼs UN Delegate suggested a commission of experts with the participation of the two parties to fix the frontier. The U.S. Mission believed this would be unacceptable to Cambodia as challenging the existing frontier, so suggested a commission of experts to physically mark the existing frontier as delineated on maps done in December 1954. (Ibid.)
4. Niles Gussing was the United Nations Secretary-Generalʼs personal representative sent in October 1962 to try to mediate Thai-Cambodian border differences.