Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

108. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, February 19, 1964, 7 p.m.

808. Embtel 804.² Sihanoukʼs new proposal provides further proof his penchant for public diplomacy and inability refrain from uselessly irritating preliminaries, even when he has something to say which offers constructive possibilities. Despite presumptuous summoning to U.S., Thai and Vietnamese plenipotentiaries at Phnom Penh within short time limits and his offensive and unjustified accusation U.S. has been active enemy Cambodian neutrality and has instigated plots aimed at destroying neutral Cambodia, believe Sihanoukʼs present initiative represents backward step for him and is worth consideration as offering possible alternative to ultimatum he issued February 15 (Embtel 790).³

Advantages we see in Sihanoukʼs new proposal are:

1) It provides way for U.S., Thais, and SVN to avoid attending conference without incurring risk (which country team considers real one) Sihanouk will do what he says he will do—namely recognize Hanoi, abandon neutrality, enter defensive agreements Hanoi and Peiping, and break relations with U.S. and possibly U.K.

2) Settlement Cambodiaʼs borders with its neighbors would be essential element in any easing of tensions; in effect Sihanouk reverting to earlier position reconciliation and with his neighbors contingent upon recognition for present borders. While we aware Thai reluctance subscribe formal recognition document and difficulties inherent in attempting establish border between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, we believe might be worth exploring possibility opened by Sihanoukʼs initiative for useful negotiations toward eventual settlement.

3) New proposal apparently does not require U.S. provide guarantees but it would commit Cambodia not to make military alliances and to deny use its territory to Viet Cong, commitment which would be backed by activity expanded ICC.

Disadvantages seen are:

1) Proposal extremely vague and, unless spelled out before actual proposed meeting, subject to last minute introduction undesirable elements and interpretations arising from Sihanoukʼs fertile imagination and unprincipled gamesmanship.

2) U.S. required pay cost of expanded ICC as well as cost of tractors to be furnished under grotesque Castro-like “gentlemenʼs agreement” as compensation for Cambodian deaths as result border incidents.

3) Proposal does not eliminate Geneva Conference but would simply excuse U.S., Thailand and Viet-Nam from attending. (However, if agreement of type proposed reached among four countries, UK might take position no real reason remains for conference.)

We recognize that Sihanoukʼs new and startling proposal unlikely prove attractive to GVN and, especially, RTG. However, seems to us, given strong possibility only alternative may be carrying out Sihanoukʼs threats of February 15, would be in interest our SEA allies as well as ourselves at least attempt explore further just what kind of four-power agreement Sihanouk has in mind (including any texts he may already have drawn up) with view ascertaining whether any real possibility for negotiation to produce desired result of re-establishment relations between Cambodia and its neighbors, denial Cambodian territory to Viet Cong, and continued neutrality this country. Subject views Embassies Bangkok and Saigon, Department may wish authorize them discuss Sihanoukʼs new proposal with respective governments with view ascertaining whether they agreeable to our attempting seek further clarification from RKG, including text draft which would expose RKG hand, in context of possible willingness on part U.S., RTG, and GVN negotiation along lines suggested if agreement can be reached on objectives and procedures. We would strongly oppose holding negotiations under such proposals in Cambodia, where Sihanouk could disrupt or stage manage conversations through press conferences, broadcasts or other means to suit his whims. Perhaps Kuala Lumpur might be most satisfactory locale if talks should take place, as Tunku has expressed interest in assisting settlement difficulties between RKG and its neighbors.

Sprouse

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, Vientiane, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Passed to the White House.
2. See footnote 2, Document 109.
3. In telegram 790 from Phnom Penh, February 15, the Embassy reported that Sihanouk threatened to recognize North Vietnam (DRV), sign defensive agreements with the DRV and the Peopleʼs Republic of China (PRC), and break relations with the United States. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 32–1 CAMB–VIET S)