107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia1
517. Phnom Penh 747.2 Although your suggestion USG inform Sihanouk our acceptance UK draft has attraction as possibly obviating conference, we could not do this without serious injury our relations with Thai and Vietnamese and therefore to our own interests. Moreover it is far from sure that this step would still Sihanoukʼs desire for conference. Also Communists might not find UK draft to their liking and themselves then demand conference to iron out differences.
GVN FonMin made clear GVN found it impossible to support any neutrality declaration regardless how achieved. This means such unilateral step by US would cause serious difficulties in our relations with that country. Although Sihanouk may consider it unimportant whether Thai and Vietnamese take part in an internationally negotiated neutrality for Cambodia, we disagree and consider that they are parties most vitally concerned. We cannot and will not disregard their interests merely to satisfy Sihanouk. Our commitment in Viet-Nam is so great that we must regard our other actions in SEA in light of their possible effect on achieving our objectives in Viet-Nam. By his neutrality thrust DeGaulle has considerably complicated our already difficult problem in Viet-Nam. We must be very careful not to aggravate it by our own actions vis-à-vis Sihanoukʼs demand for neutrality which fits into DeGaulleʼs scheme and in French view is desired preliminary step to neutralization of all Indochina.
One of Gen. Khanhʼs two stated reasons for taking over power was to obliterate move toward neutralism within GVN. It is obvious that the more GVN and Vietnamese people feel that US is negotiating over neutralization of Cambodia the more difficult it will be to convince them that this does not alter our commitments and will to win in Viet-Nam. A conference to internationalize Cambodiaʼs neutrality will in Vietnamese eyes be step two (after Laos) in eventual neutralization of all Indochina. If the US supports this, then their will to continue their struggle will diminish. We might be faced in SVN with the alternative of pulling out, putting in massive US force, or ourselves agreeing to some sort of neutralization. We have told the GVN we will not consider a Cambodian neutrality conference unless agreement is had beforehand on expected results. In view of [Page 259] what GVN now faces and our own commitment in Viet-Nam and our relations with Thailand we must at least maintain this position.
Thailand has been somewhat more flexible than Viet-Nam. Nevertheless, after consulting with Thai on UK draft we could not suddenly agree to sign without taking into consideration their modifications. Thailand is not fighting a war, nor is it under direct or immediate pressure for inclusion in French proposed neutrality belt. There is however latent neutralism in Thai thinking. Since Thailand is gateway for application of US force in SEA we must thwart moves to neutralize Thailand if we wish to maintain our position in SEA. For this basic reason we cannot afford to let preoccupation with Sihanoukʼs demands damage our relations with Thailand.
We recognize UK and possibly France may welcome opportunity to agree with Sihanouk on UK draft as it stands and thereby hopefully put matter to rest. For reasons cited above however we cannot agree and will resist pressure on us to take this or similar step in order to keep Sihanouk from carrying out his various threats. We recognize Sihanouk may sever relations with us and make some kind of arrangement with Communists. We do not however share French and UK views as to seriousness of effect of latter step. We doubt Sihanouk would sever ties with UK and France, particularly in view his need for French aid. The Communists will likely be very careful about committing themselves very deeply to the erratic Sihanouk, particularly if we made clear our opposition. France would like to replace us in Cambodia and they are not likely to acquiesce in Sihanoukʼs turning completely to Communists.
We would sincerely regret break in our relations but this has been a possibility since cessation of our aid. Although we do not count on it, it is always possible that domestic pressures may confine Sihanouk to continuing threats and further deadlines. In any case, we cannot sacrifice our commitments to Thailand and Viet-Nam to meet Sihanoukʼs threats which would not likely cease even if his neutrality proposals were internationally agreed.
We believe it advisable to make our position on his proposals clear to Sihanouk as soon as possible and before he announces publicly his new May deadline. Otherwise we may appear to be responding to his blackmail. Therefore, if you do not shortly receive audience appointment in connection with Phil good offices, you should make another request. If in meantime nothing has occurred to alter our position on “reconciliation” exchanges, you should carry this out and then speak on neutrality question in accordance Deptel 492.3 Emphasis throughout should be laid on necessity for all concerned to agree on proposals.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–13 CAMB. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Koren, cleared by Hilsman and Harriman, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok, Saigon, Paris, London, Ottawa, and CINCPAC for POLAD.↩
- In telegram 747, February 4, Sprouse suggested that the Department “give serious consideration our going on record with Sihanouk through UK as one of Co-Chairmen by expressing willingness to accept drafts as they stand, thus obviating need for conference if other concerned countries agree.” (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 492 to Phnom Penh, January 29, reiterated that the Embassyʼs instructions had not changed. (Ibid.)↩