Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

545. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, November 27, 1967, 1545Z.

1. Interview Harriman with PM Etemadi² Nov. 25, and subsequent dinner for delegation hosted by PM, were conducted in atmosphere unusual warmth. PM and Afghan Ministers present gave impression they felt occasion offered them important opportunity set forth problems faced by new government and express views and hopes.

2. Also present at interview were Yaftali (Deputy PM), Hamed (Min Planning), Farhadi (MFA), Amb Neumann, Spain and McClure.

3. PM opened by saying vote of confidence in new [garble—government] showed democratic experiment proceeding successfully. Key to dealing with Parliament was frankness and sincerity.

4. PM felt by far most serious problems facing him were economic. He anticipated need for austerity, and was concerned about new 5-year plan. Afghanistan needed understanding and cooperation from friends, particularly U.S. Appreciated report of Agricultural Review Team,³ but needed assistance, particularly wheat. Achievement self-sufficiency in wheat in 5 or 6 years, he felt, depended both on political stability and continued foreign aid. In passing, PM noted his belief there had been some hoarding of good 1967 wheat harvest because of what he considered to have been lack of political stability in recent past.

5. Yaftali stressed financial problems. Said RGA realized it must do more about tax and fiscal reforms, but insisted foreign aid was essential. Expressed concern about debt repayment to USSR. In response Harriman’s question about extent to which gas would meet this problem, he said it would really help only after full production rate reached in 2 or 3 years.

6. Both PM and Yaftali emphasized that top priority for RGA efforts was in agriculture.

7. When Yaftali mentioned that fertilizer loan funds had been diverted to HIQ road, PM interjected that completion of road was very important for Afghanistan, particularly for development trade with outside world through Iran. Added that RGA also hoped connect with projected Iranian road to port of Bandar Abbas, but would need foreign technical and financial aid to pave necessary 200 kilometers.

8. Yaftali said RGA was trying encourage more private sector activity (he cited light industries and textiles as export possibilities). Said RGA had already removed some export taxes and planned to do more. When he referred to discussions with IMF, Harriman commented IMF recommendations are usually very sound.

9. Yaftali then turned to plea for indication of general extent prospective US assistance during 5-year plan period. Referred to “shopping list” transmitted some months ago. PM said Parliament was demanding such indication, and parliamentary approval of plan depended considerably upon RGA’s ability to furnish meaningful answer. Later in conversation, he said fact that of 180 deputies who spoke in recent debate on government a great number had talked about plan showed intensity of public interest and expectations re planned development. He acknowledged past assistance, and said both RGA and Afghan people recognized depth of American good will for their country. This was why he felt he should be fully frank during visit (a friendly gesture in itself, which he highly appreciated) about what was really needed from US. One thing, he said, was wheat, which RGA needed soon, partly to impart a sense of security throughout country after what happened in local wheat market last winter and spring.

10. Asked about other aid donors, PM said USSR had already committed itself to support plan. Delegation was going to Moscow shortly to firm up specific projects. French were expanding technical assistance, and were considering some industrial projects; he estimated French aid contribution at about $15 million. Germany was helping too. However, Afghanistan counted mainly on US and USSR.

11. Gov Harriman replied that USG certainly wanted to help. Some assistance would undoubtedly be possible, but we could not be sure just how much. Congress was severely reducing the resources available. Long-term commitments were more of a problem than ever. Harriman said he could therefore not answer some of PM’s questions, except to say that USG had deep respect for PM and RGA and desired be helpful. He personally appreciated fact that Afghanistan was at a turning point in economic development. Added that USG believes strongly in importance of agriculture for countries like Afghanistan and realizes its development is slow process.

12. On other subjects, exchanges were equally friendly and frank.

13. PM spent what we felt was inordinate amount of time on Pushtunistan issue. Said this was only major problem in way of brotherly relations with Pakistan with which Afghanistan has so much in common. Recalled at length Afghan restraint and support of Pakistan in 1965 war. But he insisted both countries had to face issue, and both would gain immensely if true will of Pushtun people expressed. PM emphasized pressures upon RGA from Parliament. He expressed considerable bitterness about Ayub’s recent book,⁴ saying it undid years of careful work to improve relations.

14. When asked for specific proposals, PM said it was simple; will of Pushtun people must be expressed. As practical matter, main thing needed was statement of intention by Pakistan willingness to discuss subject.

15. In further discussion, PM mentioned incidentally that UN had been helpful in cause of peace, but Afghanistan had no intention take Pushtunistan issue to UN. Harriman said Pushtunistan was bilateral problem. US regretted its existence, hoped relations among parties would improve, but did not see how we could usefully get involved. USG did, however, have greatest respect for and interest in Afghanistan. PM concluded what Afghanistan needed on this issue was understanding.

16. PM stressed gratitude his government and many Afghans for USG kindness in providing medical care for former PM Maiwandwal.

17. Re Iran, PM said relations were very good and improving daily. Poor relations of past were due mainly to mutual lack of knowledge. Today there was no political problem, only technical one on distribution Helmand waters.

18. Re Communist China, PM said after some prodding that relations remained “correct.” Projects under loan proceeding satisfactorily. He added with smile we should really ask our Pak friends about this, since they were very close to Chinese.

19. On Middle East, PM said he shared Harriman’s gratification that UN resolution adopted unanimously by SC.⁵ PM also characterized King Hussein as “wise and courageous.” On Cyprus, Governor and PM agreed situation tragic, Greece and Turkey must eventually get over emotional approach to problem.

20. On Vietnam, Harriman stressed President Johnson’s desire for peace negotiations, shared by almost all countries including USSR. Hanoi misjudging attitude of American people and determination see matter through. PM expressed thanks for this and previous expositions US position. Said Geneva agreements were obvious basis for solution.

21. Governor expressed appreciation for PM’s frankness and obvious readiness face realities. PM made clear throughout conversation his appreciation for visit by delegation.⁶

Neumann

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 US/HARRIMAN. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade and Bucharest for Harriman, and to Rawalpindi and Tehran. Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman made a trip to Pakistan for the dedication of the Mangla Dam November 21–27 and stopped in Kabul on the return journey for talks with the King and Prime Minister Etemadi. A record of Harriman’s meeting with the King is in telegram 1577 from Belgrade, November 26. (Ibid.)
2. On October 11 Prime Minister Maiwandwal resigned, and on November 1 the King appointed Foreign Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi as Prime Minister.
3. A U.S. Agricultural Review Team was sent to Afghanistan June 20–July 20 to advise the Afghan Government on measures to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. (Telegram 4725 from Kabul, May 20; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 AGR) On October 2 President Johnson sent a letter to Prime Minister Maiwandwal enclosing the report and recommendations of the agricultural experts. (Ibid., POL 15–1 AFG)
4. Reference is to Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
5. Reference is to UN Resolution 242 passed by the Security Council on November 22, 1967. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1967, pp. 616–617.
6. On December 9 Ambassador Neumann called on the Prime Minister to expand on Harriman’s November 25 conversation. He stressed the importance of self-help measures by Afghanistan and explained the restrictions imposed by Congress on the availability of total resources. (Telegram 4266 from Kabul, December 11; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 AFG)