Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

532. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, May 6, 1965, 1200Z.

660. Ref Embtel 659.² For Secretary from Ambassador. Reftel reports watershed session I had with PriMin May 5. While I most reluctant add extraordinarily heavy burdens you are carrying feel I would be derelict my duty were I not to call to your personal attention implications PriMin’s position for future US-Afghan relations.

If we are to be prevented by our own regulations or other factors from stepping up assistance on Helmand Valley project, with which we have been so closely associated for fifteen years, Afghans quite likely request us terminate this major US activity here. Since many key Afghan officials, such as MinFin and MinInt, have been personally identified with Helmand Valley in past and it is in a very real sense seen here as heart our economic program, Afghans are likely regard any such development as “abandonment” by USG. This would set in train here developments gradually curtailing our position and influence.

We presently undertaking joint US-Afghan technical discussions see whether goals envisioned by PriMin feasible but I am not sanguine outcome unless we able to do more ourselves than so far authorized. Accordingly, before curtailment along lines above suggested takes place, believe policy determination required as to whether maintenance our existing satisfactory position here of sufficient importance USG, and to its CENTO allies Iran and Pakistan, to warrant us making special effort provide forthcoming response to PriMin and thus maintaining major and productive US presence in Helmand Valley development to which Afghans now giving highest priority.³

Steeves

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 33–1 AFG–IRAN/HELMAND. Secret; Exdis.
2. In telegram 659 from Kabul, May 6, Ambassador Steeves reported on his conversation with Prime Minister Yusuf, who informed him that he and his cabinet had decided to give top priority and assign whatever resources might be required to accelerate the Helmand Valley project. Yusuf asked for a definite answer as to U.S. plans “for the completion of the project.” Following a lengthy discussion, they agreed to defer further deliberation until after their joint technical planners could meet to consider what could realistically be achieved in the Valley. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 326 to Kabul, May 11, the Department of State commented: “Ambassador can be sure we will take his warning signal seriously. We do not intend to let US-Afghan relations deteriorate but neither can we ignore our own aid standards and political requirements. We will seek to resolve our problems with Afghanistan in order to enable us to do what is required to maintain an effective U.S. presence there.” (Ibid.)