511. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
Rawalpindi, August 24, 1968,
0705Z.
7085. From Ambassador. Subject: USSR Military Supply for Pakistan.
- 1.
- This morning the Defense Minister and Defense Secretary informed me that USSR has agreed in principle to sell GOP any hardware it wants, including tanks.
- 2.
- They added that last night President Ayub had asked the Minister
to inform me that he is reluctant to act on this agreement because:
- A.
- From an economic viewpoint he would prefer to acquire cheaper, second-hand material;
- B.
- From a logistical viewpoint he would prefer to acquire U.S.-produced material;
- C.
- Most importantly, he wished to avoid, if possible, any increased dependence on USSR.
- 3.
- They then stated that despite Ayub’s reluctance, he would be forced to move in the Russian direction unless he could be assured early-on that U.S. manufactured sources would be forthcoming.
- 4.
- They then alluded to Iran, stating that this was, from their viewpoint, the cheapest, quickest and most certain source.
- 5.
- After explaining our Congressional problem vis-à-vis Iran, I informed them, without in any way identifying the countries, that we were having discussions with two other possible sources and hoped to have determined their position within the next several weeks.
- 6.
- They reverted to Iran, suggesting that USG, GOP and GOI could have a private, gentlemen’s agreement among a very limited number of people in each government, that tanks would be forthcoming from Iran after Congress adjourns—for delivery next calendar year. I depreciated the practicabilities of such an agreement, including the prospects that it could remain secret.2
Oehlert
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR-PAK. Secret; Exdis.↩
- The Department confirmed in telegram 231334 to Rawalpindi, August 31, that the proposed “gentlemen’s agreement” was not feasible. The Department indicated that negotiations with Turkey concerning the sale of U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan were underway, with the prospect of an agreement in September. Oehlert was instructed to avoid replying to Admiral Khan’s approach if possible until the negotiations with Turkey were concluded. (Ibid., DEF 12–5 PAK)↩