45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
2398. Following summary FYI only and Noforn. It is uncleared and subject to amendment upon review of memcon.
Indian DefMin Chavan and Amb BK Nehru met with Secretary and Talbot May 21.2 Chavan opened up discussion saying talks between Indian Defense team and DOD indicated US and India were in substantial agreement on ChiCom threat, which had increased somewhat since 1962. While there is apparently little imminent danger of attack, this cannot be ruled out. In order be prepared for this eventuality and make most careful use of resources, GOI has prepared Five-Year Defense Plan. Although defense effort under Plan sizeable, it will have no adverse effect on economic development. Plan places priority on building defense production base and securing combat aircraft. Chavan requested US support to Five-Year Defense Plan, consisting of MAP at the same levels as last two years and credit sales assistance.
[Page 105]Indicating specific reply on these matters up to Secretary McNamara and President, Secretary described difficulties we have already had with Congress this year concerning long-term military aid. Also stated President may be reluctant make commitments extending beyond his present term.
Turning to Indo-Pak problems Secretary described circumstances under which CENTO established in order meet Soviet threat and under which US extended military aid to Pakistan. Now India was threatened by China and was also obtaining US military aid. India and Pakistan, however, are “looking over their shoulders at each other” and we must examine how we have unwittingly gotten into supporting arms race on subcontinent. When we think of possibilities for subcontinental defense we agonize at Indo-Pak enmity.
Chavan replied India also wished resolve problems with Pakistan but must avoid actions which, instead of solving problems, might multiply them. Explained Abdullah’s activities constitute new factor in Kashmir situation; India wishes him well.
Secretary inquired how far Indians believed Pak-ChiCom relationship has progressed. Chavan replied there apparently no Pak-ChiCom military agreement but if ChiComs attack India GOI fearful Paks will take action to tie down Indian forces.
Re China threat, Chavan repeated line that 1966–67 critical period because Katmandu Road and possibly Lhasa Railroad would be completed. Secretary inquired regarding effect in India of ChiCom explosion of nuclear device. Chavan saw effect considerably greater in smaller Asian countries than in India although fact of explosion would also cause psychological reaction in India. Secretary commented he saw explosion possible within next year although Soviets had told us it not likely for 4–5 years. Remarked Asian countries could take little comfort from ChiCom’s lack of sophisticated delivery system since general lack sophisticated air defense in free Asia meant such delivery system unnecessary. Secretary also said, judging on basis his wartime experiences in eastern India, in his view Chinese unlikely attack through Burma because of logistic difficulties.
When, in response question, Chavan commented on lasting character Sino-Soviet rift, Secretary said we have, nevertheless, assumed neither Soviets nor ChiComs could afford see other punished in conflict with capitalist nations. Therefore, we assumed alliance would not be dissolved. Secretary wondered if opportunity bring India under Communist control presented to Soviets and ChiComs, it might possibly draw the two together. He concluded Sino-Soviet split important but not complete enough for either US or India to rely upon.
At conclusion of discussion Secretary said India could be assured US much concerned about any attempt by ChiComs break out into rest [Page 106] of Asia. Entirely aside from our concern for Indian development and security, basic US interest requires peace and security in both Atlantic and Pacific. If Peiping continues down course of aggression there will be serious trouble. Referring to great burden we bear in world, Secretary once more noted US distress at contrast between what could be achieved on subcontinent through Indo-Pak cooperation and what is being accomplished. This is tragedy for India as well as US.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27 CHICOM-INDIA. Secret; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Schneider in NEA/SOA.↩
- Chavan also met with Harriman on May 21. The conversation is summarized in telegram 2400 to New Delhi, May 23. (Ibid., DEF 19–2 US–INDIA)↩