373. Letter From President Johnson to Prime Minister Gandhi1
Dear Mrs. Gandhi:
After I talked with Ambassador Nehru about his visit to India, I read with deep interest your letter2 which he delivered to me personally.
I understand the serious domestic problems which you are facing in your pre-election period. You know you have my friendship and sympathy as you confront them.
Secretary Freeman has also given me a firsthand report of his recent trip to India. I was encouraged by what he had to say about your resolute efforts to increase agricultural production and reduce the rate of population increase. The problems you face in these areas are formidable, but I am confident that you and your nation are on the right track and that you will overcome them. I join those who are praying that the next harvest in India will be bountiful.
As you know, we have also had a drought and our harvest is not expected to be good. We will do what we can to help you through the difficult food situation you face in the months ahead, although the help we may be able to give may not be as much as we both would want.
I admire the courage you showed in devaluing the rupee and embarking on a program of import liberalization. I share your hope that this program will be successful.
Few problems in this troubled world have given me more cause for concern during the past year than your country’s relations with Pakistan. You know how highly I value my personal relationship of confidence and trust with you and President Ayub. You also know that I want to contribute constructively to the material progress, dignity, and security of both India and Pakistan. As I told you when you were here, it is painful for all of us when two friends are forced by history into a relationship with each other such as that which now exists between India and Pakistan.
I am particularly concerned at what appears to be growing mistrust within each country regarding the intentions of the other. I fear that the result will be that both you and President Ayub will face increasing problems with your own citizens in maintaining a public atmosphere which would make possible a process leading to reconciliation. I very much hope that both you and President Ayub will try to avoid or [Page 727] deflate public charges and countercharges which further dissipate the political climate achieved at Tashkent. Public statements about military force levels increase the difficulties you both face in avoiding the arms race that neither of you wants.
Some Pakistanis may still cling to the false notion that their objectives in Kashmir can be obtained by force. I believe that President Ayub does not subscribe to such a view and his signing of the Tashkent agreement gives you this assurance. I have always found him to be a man of honor.
Our information does not support the statement that Pakistan is preparing for radical action against India. Nor do I have the impression that relations between Pakistan and Communist China have altered significantly toward closer cooperation during the last few weeks. This is, of course, a matter about which I share your concern. But strained relations between India and Pakistan increase Pakistani receptivity to improving its relations with China. On the other hand, improved India-Pakistan relations could become a guarantee that Pakistan would not move further in a direction we both deplore.
Therefore, I would urge both you and President Ayub to bend every effort to reestablish trusted communications between your representatives which will lessen the present spiral of apprehension and make possible a more rational approach to many specific issues that now set you at odds.
In this connection I greatly welcomed your expression of willingness to see arms levels discussed. If you believe we could be helpful in bringing about the opening of such a dialogue, we would, of course, welcome any suggestion you might have.
I note that your talks with President Nasser, President Tito, and Chairman Kosygin led you to conclude that they, like our two governments, are in basic agreement on moving the Viet Nam problem to the conference table. The crucial question, of course, remains how this objective can be brought about. India is in a position to be of help in resolving this issue, which thus far has stubbornly resisted our most intensive and searching efforts and those of our friends in many countries.
You mention that you are in touch with Hanoi. We will give the closest attention to whatever concrete indications that channel may produce that Hanoi has come to a genuine and realistic interest in finding a mutually acceptable basis for talks. A reduction of hostilities, including a cessation of bombing, is possible if matched by reciprocal action by the other side. This action need not be of a formal or declared nature. It could take any of a number of possible verifiable forms which, as you put it, need not necessarily be construed as a “sign of weakness” on Hanoi’s part. We are not looking for signs of weakness from Hanoi, but rather for a genuine desire on its part to end this conflict.
[Page 728]Thank you for your gracious words about my daughter. The problems and feelings of parents the world over are, indeed, much the same.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence File, India, 3/1/66–12/31/66. No classification marking.↩
- See Document 368.↩