Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

362. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, July 26, 1966, 2:06 p.m.

15058. Eyes only for the Ambassador from the Secretary. I much appreciated your thoughtful 1307.² I have no doubt that Indian reaction would be sharp but there are certain factors in my mind which were not discussed in your telegram on which I would appreciate your further comments.

1. In present circumstances, India is moving toward a complete military domination of the subcontinent. Her own military production capability plus very substantial increments of Soviet equipment puts her in the position of saying that it is all right for India to build up its armed forces from the Soviet Union but not all right for Pakistan to acquire even spare parts from the United States.

2. India should be concerned about any Chinese military influence south of the Himalayas. If the United States does not supply spare parts to Pakistan, Pakistan will be impelled to take more and more from Peking. Is this in India’s interest? This is the other side of the coin of the Indian view that spare parts from us to Pakistan would constitute joint action by Peking and Washington to build up Pakistan at India’s expense.

3. India’s conduct over the past twenty years with regard to Kashmir is difficult to accept. Her view that this is not a dispute but a closed question runs counter to repeated actions by the United Nations and bumps into the long standing and instinctive American policy that the wishes of the people concerned should have a paramount influence on such political questions.

4. Do you really think that there is one chance in a thousand that India would take any action to be a counter-weight to Communist China in Asia unless India itself were attacked? I find it hard to believe that India would lift a finger against mainland China in any other circumstance. Relevant to this point is the outrageous departure from non-alignment which Mrs. Gandhi accepted in Moscow.

5. Although I accept that Pakistan stimulated the events of last year by sending infiltrators into Kashmir, it is nevertheless true that India, without consultation, escalated the conflict immediately by sending her own armed forces across the cease-fire line. She has been very critical of the United States over more or less drastic steps that we have taken in the face of North Vietnamese escalation. Had we reacted as forcefully as India did to Kashmir infiltrators, India would have been horrified. Accepting Pakistani responsibility for the infiltration, India must accept its share of responsibility for the scale and pace of escalation.

6. I am personally troubled by the point that the United States, having furnished ninety percent of the equipment of the Pakistan armed forces, has an obligation not to deny spare parts so long as India and Pakistan are prepared to live at peace with each other.

7. Finally, I doubt that we should move toward reliance upon India as our sole partner in the subcontinent because I do not believe that India would accept or play that role.

8. Did Mrs. Gandhi get a commitment from the Russians not to supply arms to Pakistan? Was that the price she received for the deep compromise of her non-alignment? If not, what would be Indian reaction to Soviet supply of arms to Pakistan? My guess is that they would accept it in relative good grace but still be deeply offended if we were to do the same.

Is there not basic inequity in the Indians’ expectation that we would refrain from a policy now being followed by the British? Of course, the British policy favors India many times over in terms of arms purchases by India and Pakistan.

9. My conclusion is that when all of the pretence is cast aside, the general Indian attitude is that “what India wants India gets.” The same India which preaches to others has no problem about throwing an armored division into Hyderabad, seizing Goa and calling Kashmir a closed question.

10. I fully recognize the cogency of the views put forward in your 1307 but I am concerned about the prospect that India, with all of its other problems, would find itself facing a Chinese-Pakistan combination with all of the possibilities for trouble through wars-of-liberation techniques around the frontiers of India. I would feel better about the situation if India seemed to be willing to make any substantial moves on its side to make peace with Pakistan.

I have fully noted your point about the Indian elections and the impact upon pro-American ministers such as Mehta and Subramanian. But if you have additional observations on the points above, I would appreciate it.³

Personal regards.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US–INDIA. Secret; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Rusk and cleared by Hare.
2. See footnote 2, Document 360.
3. Bowles responded with a personal telegram to Rusk on July 28. He answered Rusk point-by-point, arguing that India by virtue of its size and military strength would inevitably dominate the subcontinent, and that the United States was compelled to recognize that fact and shape its policies accordingly. On the sensitive issue of the sale of spare parts, Bowles wrote: “experience has led GOI to conclude that if the finger on trigger is Pakistani US military equipment is just as threatening to Indian security as Chinese equipment.” (Telegram 1479 from New Delhi; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–8 US INDIA)