Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

36. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, April 16, 1964, 3:56 p.m.

1380. We have been examining carefully our future policy respecting MAP policy for Pakistan in light of framework established by: General Taylor’s report,² Secretary’s January 16 memorandum to President,³ NSAM 279 of February 8,⁴ instructions to Talbot (Deptels 1174 and 1182)⁵ and discussions which you and Talbot have had with Ayub and other Pak leaders. We have decided upon following course of action:

1. We will not raise with GOP at this time (April, May) subject multi-year MAP.

In our view, discussions on “political framework” with Pak leaders have not produced fully satisfactory responses. Recent Pak signals tend to point to less cooperation rather than more. Our main concern centers on possible secret understandings between Paks and ChiComs. Until we have clearer picture of these and can judge possible effect on our over-all position in subcontinent, we will wish reserve our positions on longer term military aid questions.

2. We will proceed with discussions on FY 1965 MAP.

We recognize necessity signal to GOP our intention and desire maintain present ties. Continued silence on our part in important MAP field, when it clear we are talking MAP to Indians, could lead GOP to make serious errors in judgment about our intentions. We have significant interests in Pakistan, some of which directly linked at least in Pak mind with MAP. We believe we must, in current situation, take some steps conserve these interests and head off Paks from taking actions inimical to them.

3. Therefore, we shall initiate discussions on FY 1965 MAP with General Musa in Washington later this month.⁶

As we see it, timing of initial conversations on MAP is very important. GOP aware in general way of our Indian MAP intentions and that Chavan and defense team are coming here in May. We believe our talks with GOP should come before Chavan visit and not appear as attempt mollify GOP after Chavan departs. Musa visit provides excellent opportunity do this.

4. We shall inform Musa that FY 1965 program will not include additional aircraft but that we shall be in position to deliver additional F104As in FY 1966 provided that political climate at that time is right.

We recognize that GOP will be very concerned over our getting into aircraft field with India and that we should not continue avoid question supersonics for Pakistan. We envisage reference to possible delivery in 1966 as important double purpose step. It should help keep Pakistan reaction to Indian air package within tolerable bounds, and also serve as signal to Ayub that, if he is prepared be mindful our concerns, we shall be mindful of his. Also, breaking ice on supersonic question may provide framework for pursuing discussion on one of our key concerns.

5. We shall continue keep GOP informed about our future MAP plans for India.

You will receive instructions following Chavan visit to bring GOP up to date on our thinking on our MAP for India. During conversations here with Musa we shall inform him that we intend continue to give moderate military assistance to India and that this aid will be related to India’s development of a sound defense plan.

6. We shall keep under constant review question of whether we should at later date proceed with multi-year Pak program.

We view discussion on one-year program as interim measure and realize that by time we are ready firm up our five-year program with India, we may have to be more forthcoming with GOP to avoid serious imbalance in our military relations with India and Pakistan.

Appreciate your 1935⁷ and 1936,⁸ which received after above decisions taken. Believe approach outlined here should help meet some of your concerns.

Ball

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19 US-PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Naas; cleared by Talbot and Cameron, and in draft by Walsh, Komer, Lang (DOD/ISA), Warren (G/PM), Wriggins (S/P), Macomber (AID/NESA), and Hirschberg (AID/PC); and approved by Harriman. Repeated to New Delhi, London, and CINCSTRIKE for POLAD.
2. See footnote 2, Document 3.
3. Document 3.
4. Document 13.
5. Document 25 and footnote 2 thereto.
6. General Musa was scheduled to attend CENTO meetings in Washington.
7. Document 35.
8. In telegram 1936 from Karachi, April 11, McConaughy warned that a decision to provide 72 F–6A aircraft to India would have “far reaching and immediate negative effect” on U.S. relations with Pakistan. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–3 US–INDIA)