Office of the Historian

243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, November 10, 1965, 4:31 p.m.

808. For Ambassador from Secretary.

1.
I hope to be sending you instructions shortly about an Ayub visit. I agree fully with your recommendation that above all we must retain flexibility in our dealings with Ayub in period before visit and believe that you should know how we see things here.
2.
While there are some signs of dawning Pak appreciation of their present plight and their need for improving their US relations, we agree with your assessment (Embtel 1011)2 that even Shoaib’s proposition represents lopsided view of realities in our relationship, i.e., GOP has no rational or comparable alternative to US political, economic and material support. As Ayub must be well aware, there are few foreign leaders anywhere to whom we have been more attentive and whom we have supported more consistently.
3.
It is precisely to establish firm relationship based on such realities that makes it in Ayub’s interest to have a meeting soon with President. While we recognize, as do you, that Ayub may seek some prior reassurances to reduce his political risks, it is up to Ayub to cope with visit’s domestic implications which are after all his own creation. You have most patiently warned Ayub for years of danger inherent to his freedom of action in guiding Pakistan press and public opinion along a pro-Chinese and anti-US line.
4.
We would expect summit meeting would encompass very fundamentals and future course of US-Pakistan relations. President desires to develop personal sense of what kind of relationship best serves our mutual interests. Concern here is to develop understanding of what constitutes workable relationship between aid donor and recipient. Aid is not a state of nature which US is bound to respect. We have obligations to our citizens to demonstrate our aid is achieving concrete results in terms of objectives aid is designed to serve. In Pakistan’s case, what needs to be demonstrated to our satisfaction include the following:
a.
Actions showing Pakistan attaches priority to US and free world relationship. Pakistan must disabuse itself of any notions that threat of turning to ChiComs will cause us to come running. This won’t work [Page 460] and the sooner Paks stop using the tactic the closer we are to reaching a better understanding. What we seek is cooperative stance toward US. This does not rule out “correct” relations with China, but it does foreclose cozying up to China. In particular, positive steps to lower decibel count in Pakistan’s denunciations of US policies are long overdue. Bhutto’s distortions in New York re meetings with Ambassador Goldberg (USUN’s 1753 repeated Karachi 174)3 yet another example of GOP willful distortion of facts which has left sour taste here all too frequently over past years.
b.
Actions showing economic development has priority over dead-end policy toward India. Past US policies of support were based on premise that Pakistan attached sufficient priority to economic development that Indo-Pak differences would not be allowed to escalate into war. This assumption was proved wrong. Until both countries take steps to defuse present explosive situation and start some processes to keep their tensions under control, we don’t see possibility of fruitful long-term relationship with either country. What we want from Ayub is an indication that he is prepared to follow a course of reason on Kashmir, moderating his demands on India, so that economic development will not be sacrificed to a new Pak offensive on Kashmir and so that progress can be made toward settlement of Indo-Pak differences.
5.
On broader subject of aid resumption, etc. we want it to be unmistakably clear to the Pakistanis that regardless of the actual and as yet unknown economic costs of their recent bout of warfare, it is widely accepted here by public, as reflected on the Hill and in the journals, that two nations we have helped considerably are frittering away scarce resources, both economic and military, as they bicker and fight. Aid resumption is going to be possible only if we can convince the Congress and the public at large that this is not going to happen again, and by “we” I include the Pakistanis as well.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL PAK-US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laise; cleared by Handley, Hare, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Also sent to Rawalpindi.↩
  2. Dated November 2. (Ibid., POL 27 INDIA–PAK)↩
  3. Dated November 4. (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK)↩