Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

107. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, April 24, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Fighting in the Rann of Kutch Between India and Pakistan

Enclosed is a memorandum surveying the background and implications of developments in the Rann of Kutch. The highlights are:

• —Indo-Pak border negotiations in 1960 could not sort out the conflicting claims in this sector of the border, but both countries acknowledged that there was a dispute.
• —Hard evidence on what is actually taking place is limited. The present train of events began in January of this year when Indian patrols discovered that Pakistani posts had been established in area claimed by India.
• —The terrain gives Pakistan a military advantage which it appears to have exploited in the escalating series of incidents that have occurred in recent weeks.
• —Regular military units have recently been deployed by both sides.
• —Pakistan is bringing in troops from MAP-supported units.
• —There is danger that the fighting will intensify and spread.
• —The dispute has assumed major political significance in both Delhi and Rawalpindi, and has serious implications for our policies and programs in the subcontinent. Both parties are seeking to draw us into an emotion-laden dispute at a difficult time in our relationships with both countries.

Benjamin H. Read ²

Enclosure³

RANN OF KUTCH DISPUTE

Background

The area in dispute, extending out from the old fort of Kanjarkot, lies on the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch, a desolate area in Western India on the Arabian Sea. It is alternately salt flats and tidal basin. (The inundation lasts from June to November.) The area was admitted by both sides to be in dispute at the time of the Indo-Pakistani border negotiations of 1960. It was agreed at that time that further discussions would be held to explore the validity of the conflicting claims, but so far as we know these have not taken place.

The current difficulties apparently began in January 1965, when the Indians became aware that Pakistani border police were patrolling below the Indian claim line. India lodged a protest and increased its own patrolling activity. In mid-February, Pakistani forces dug themselves in around Kanjarkot, which may have been previously unoccupied, although Ayub claims that Pakistan had “long” occupied it. Both sides have since built up the forces available to them in the area, manned strong points, and shifted defense responsibility from border units to the army.

During April, a series of incidents has occurred with both sides blaming the other. The Pakistanis, enjoying a militarily superior position, have moved forcefully against Indian outposts near the border fort of Kanjarkot and most recently staged a “preemptive” attack at Biar Bet, deeper within the disputed area. The Indians have been mainly on the defensive but, according to Pakistan, have established outposts within undisputed Pakistani territory.

Both sides allege that the other has employed armor. The Indians have denied the charge and we have no evidence to support it. Although firm proof is lacking, there are reports supporting the Indian claim that Pakistan has moved armor to the Kutch area and that it may be engaged in action. The unit concerned, according to Embassy Karachi, is MAP-equipped. Casualties have been reported by both sides, shooting continues between patrols and strong points, and public opinion—especially in India—has been aroused sharply.

Pakistani patrolling south of Kanjarkot may have been going on for quite some time without the Indians knowing it. There is little doubt, however, that Pakistani occupation of Kanjarkot would have upset a long-standing status quo. The Indian response of occupying other posts near the frontier and, reportedly, building an airstrip nearby brought the latent crisis to a head.

It will probably not be possible to determine who began firing, and since the area involved is legitimately in dispute between Pakistan and India, it is difficult to ascertain that either side committed aggression against the territory of the other. (All action thus far has, however, been much closer to the Indian claim line than to that of Pakistan.)

Both sides have engaged in sparring over negotiations to ameliorate the situation. The Indians accepted a Pakistani ceasefire offer on April 15, but it has never been implemented. The Pakistanis demand a demilitarization of the entire disputed area as a precondition to talks, and the Indians would require a restoration of the status quo ante, including Pakistani withdrawal from Kanjarkot. Pakistan claims that Kanjarkot is not within the disputed area and India would be understandably loath to evacuate all the way down to the 24th parallel, so the prospects for a ceasefire and negotiations are dim.

Political Implications

a) India: In an atmosphere colored by India’s military humiliation by the Chinese in 1962, strong public resentment over Pakistan’s developing relationship with Peiping and the hurt feelings over the postponement of Shastri’s visit, the already beleaguered GOI cannot afford domestically to be gotten the better of by Pakistan in a military confrontation. The Indian Foreign Secretary has told our DCM that “the country is in no mood to take any more pushing in the Rann of Kutch and the GOI may be constrained to retaliate elsewhere, where conditions are more favorable to Indian forces”. The GOI’s domestic political discomfort is increased by aspects of the Kutch dispute which are analogous to the pre-1962 situation in Ladakh—e.g. the belated discovery by Indian patrols of foreign military posts in a neglected area of Indian-claimed territory.

Even before the activization of the Kutch dispute, the moderate Shastri government proved to be most vulnerable politically to charges of weakness and indecision. Pakistan’s apparent utilization of U.S.-supplied MAP equipment in the dispute further complicates the situation domestically for the GOI by providing additional grounds for criticism to extremists of both the left and right who can exploit traditional Indian resentments over U.S.-Pakistan security agreements of the 1950’s and India’s acceptance in 1962 of more rigid constraints on the use of U.S. military equipment.

b) Pakistan: The Kutch dispute, occurring in an area of Pak military superiority, provides the GOP with several opportunities. Diplomatically, it provides Pakistan an opportunity to damage Indo-U.S. relations, through the use of MAP equipment in a situation where there is some ambiguity over the justification of its use. Additionally, the Kutch dispute provides Pakistan, in the weeks just before Bandung II, with an opportunity to brand India as an aggressor in Afro-Asian eyes. This objective will be further advanced if Pak actions in Kutch cause India to retaliate elsewhere, especially if India should move into an area generally recognized as Pak territory. Domestically, the Kutch confrontation enables the GOP to score over India, despite India’s overall military superiority, particularly in Kashmir and along the East Pak border.

Finally, Pakistan undoubtedly calculates that India’s response to the Kutch situation will lend a plausibility to the basic Pak contention that India would use its military strength enhanced by our military assistance to intimidate Pakistan and stick to an intransigent policy on Kashmir, rather than in combatting Communist China.

c) United States: The fighting in Kutch, particularly Pakistan’s probable use of MAP equipment, has propelled us once more into the center of a subcontinental dispute at a moment when our leverage in both countries is at a low point. Our relations with India, already exacerbated by the postponement of Shastri’s visit, will be further strained by public charges of Pakistan’s use of MAP equipment. Moreover, our problems with the GOI will be complicated by the fact that we have imposed more stringent conditions on Indian use of MAP equipment (i.e. only against Communist China) than the conditions imposed on Pakistan. This discrepancy may assume exaggerated significance in view of the fact that the Soviets have imposed no conditions whatsoever on use of the military assistance they have supplied India. This complicating aspect of the situation may be highlighted by Shastri’s imminent departure for Moscow in an atmosphere of resentment over the postponement of his visit to the United States.

In recent years, India’s preoccupation with the China threat has led the GOI to rely heavily on our ability to restrain Pakistan whenever Indo-Pak tensions have threatened to get out of hand. In the present situations, the Indians have indicated they would like help in promoting a ceasefire.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol. IV, Memos&Miscellaneous, 12/64–6/65. Secret.
2. Another member of the Secretariat signed for Read above his typed signature in an illegible hand.
3. Secret; Noforn.