Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa

99. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

Washington, January 4, 1964, 4:49 p.m.

1260. Embtel 947—King’s request for arms.² FYI. Most careful consideration has been given to King’s demarche to you of December 21 re possibility increased military assistance. Request has been viewed against following background: (a) Continuing importance U.S. relations both countries and Africa generally. (b) Continuing OAU efforts to establish demilitarized zone to which GOM has not yet given its support. (c) Possible further Algerian buildup in materiel which would tip present military advantage in favor Algeria once GOA overcame present training and organizational problems. (d) U.S. desire avoid arms race in Africa and restrictions on U.S. ability provide significant military assistance GOM view foreign aid limitations. (e) Desire avoid, if possible, creation new area cold war confrontation. (f) U.S. interest Kenitra. (g) Recent French military assistance to Morocco which presumably will be added to as necessary. End FYI.

Following U.S. response should be conveyed Foreign Offices U.K., France, and Spain. Ambassador Ferguson should inform respective Ambassadors Rabat. In absence of significant objection Ambassador Ferguson should seek audience with King January 7 or as soon thereafter as his presence in Morocco permits:

1. U.S. is following and fully supports King’s efforts to maintain and strengthen independence of Morocco and feels it has continually demonstrated its interest in Moroccan independence, unity, and progress.

2. U.S. recognizes legitimate GOM concern over shipments of military equipment to Algeria. On basis our intelligence, however, GOA still faces formidable task in attempts overcome training and organizational difficulties. In our judgment Moroccan equipment and its recent mobilization of 30,000 troops seems an adequate response. We would not wish dissuade GOM from improving its own security situation, but we believe substantial arms acquisition from whatever source requires close evaluation political and economic consequences. In our view, such acquisition, beyond that normally being supplied from French and U.S. sources not justified by assessment of Algerian forces nor by present possibilities for political settlement.

3. U.S. has noted with satisfaction considerable success King has had in recent weeks in redressing admittedly dangerous situation of last October. Constructive attitude Morocco demonstrated at Bamako, Addis, and Abidjan have reflected favorably on King’s statesmanship and sense of African responsibility. Restraint practiced by GOM since cease-fire and GOM willingness resume diplomatic representation with GOA have considerably strengthened Moroccan position vis-a-vis GOA not only with Bamako conferees whose prestige involved in successful outcome their efforts but with other African states as well.

4. U.S. recognizes that problem of this kind poses difficulties in terms of compromises that may be necessary in any final solution. However, we believe progress already made by King on African scene justifies his continuing support OAU effort both by reaching such agreement as is possible on withdrawal and by considering sympathetically ultimate proposals of OAU.

5. U.S. is not aware that Algeria has placed restrictions on exchange diplomatic relations to extent indicated by King and is seeking clarification in matter. We would hope problem could be worked out in coming meeting at Cairo. We would not consider Algerian conditions unreasonable if it relates solely implementation work OAU commission.

6. In pursuing political solution, we believe keen interest both Haile Selassie and Mobito Keita is important element. We would propose King might wish make known to them his concern over arms acquisition in Algeria and Algerian response his overtures on diplomatic relations. U.S. prepared lend support their consideration of problem if King desires.

7. One important factor in establishing African sympathy for Morocco has been adverse African reaction to Algerian acceptance of UAR, Cuban, and Soviet arms in initial period of conflict. We understand arms flow to Algeria has diminished. GOM acceptance now of substantial quantities of arms from Soviets would completely undercut one aspect of support from African and, in frankness it must be added, Western sources.

8. U.S. has situation under continuing review and should it change materially we would be prepared to reexamine our position in consultation with other interested governments.³

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19 US–MOR. Secret. Drafted by Newsom in AF/AFN; cleared by Colonel Heffner in OSD/ISA, Hinman in AID, Beigel in EUR/WE, Valdes in EUR/SOV, and Kitchen; and approved by Williams. Repeated to London, Madrid, Paris, Algiers, and by pouch to Moscow.
2. Telegram 947 from Rabat, December 21, 1963, reported on King Hassan’s December 20 meeting with the U.S., British, French, and Spanish Chiefs of Mission in Rabat, during which he expressed his concern over the growing strength of Algerian forces and noted that the Soviet Union had indicated its willingness to provide Morocco with arms. The King emphasized that he had to protect his national territory and said that he would deal with the devil himself if necessary for the defense of his country. (Ibid., POL 32–1 ALG–MOR)
3. In telegram 1019, January 11, Ambassador Ferguson reported that he had communicated the substance of telegram 1260 to Acting Foreign Minister Driss Slaoui. (Ibid., DEF 19 US–MOR)