Office of the Historian

89. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya1

Washington, June 30, 1967, 3:58 p.m.

219716. Ref: Tripoli 332.2 Joint State/Defense.

1.
Concur generally with your ideas for initial session re Wheelus with FonMin Bishti (reftel) and offer following comments and guidance.
2.
We understand Bishti likely remain in New York at least through June 30, when Libya inscribed to speak at special UNGA.
3.
We do not want to leave Wheelus at this stage and therefore should play it cool. FYI: Recent Soviet activities in Eastern Mediterranean and rumors USSR may be seeking bases in Arab countries are disquieting and further developments along this line might have effect on both US and Libyan negotiating attitude. End FYI.
4.
We do not know for sure what Libyan Government actually wants us to do, and first session should probe to ascertain this. Therefore we should not be so forthcoming as to invite Libyan demands (in GOL effort to get itself off Cairo hook) that we take early action toward reducing US presence. Possible that internal situation will improve or Arabs [Page 133] will split, reducing pressure on Wheelus. Moreover, King has expressed desire we spin out negotiations.
5.
Nevertheless, odds are that discussions will be held with GOL which is running scared. Atmosphere will be affected by (a) UNGA outcome and (b) degree of GOL success in restoring oil production, latter being test of Libyan determination and ability to lead public and control adherence to GOL policy. While USAF is under substantial handicap due to suspension of training, and there is some danger that long hiatus in training operations may make it harder for GOL to authorize resumption, the controlling aspect should be to retain US rights and presence and resume training, over longer time frame if need be, when political climate permits rather than press for immediate answer which might well invite a “no”. Unstable and delicate internal situation in Libya, even under new government, may well be an additional limiting factor. We therefore leave your discretion how you play this softly and let training aspect arise without unnecessary pressure for quick decision.
6.
In negotiating session you should if possible touch on content of public statements GOL may wish to issue. We assume that anything you say during negotiations will be grist for Libyan publicity mill. We hope avoid kind of publicity which might serve interests inimical to both GOL and USG. Of course we recognize desirability show forward progress. If helpful to GOL, we willing issue agreed statement (ad referendum to Dept) from Washington.
8.
Re para 7 reftel, we see advantages to future negotiating sessions taking place in less formal atmosphere than 1964 meetings. USG has accepted “principle of withdrawal” at end of Wheelus agreement; discussions re means or timing, and provision for orderly return to normal operations at Wheelus, will take place in established diplomatic framework.
9.
Hope that dimensions of any necessary RIF of local staff at Wheelus will not give unhelpful impression Wheelus closedown imminent. There should be no repeat no withdrawals even of surplus supplies from Wheelus that could give rise to public impression we were withdrawing now.
10.
Following first session and provided local situation quiet, you will be expected proceed Washington via Germany and UK.

London inform FonOff of foregoing, except FYI portion.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 15 LIBYA–US. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Campbell on June 29; cleared by Eugene V. Rostow, Jones in AF, Root, Neuman, Wolf, Judd, Kohler, General Sibley of JCS, Bronez and Bader in DOD/ISA, and Hilbert; and approved by Palmer. Repeated to London, CINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE.↩
  2. In telegram 332 from Tripoli, June 26, Newsom said that he thought the primary U.S. purpose during the first meeting on Wheelus should be to request Libyan advice and assistance on early restoration of normal base operations without prejudice to the final outcome of the discussions. (Ibid.)↩